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Abstract
In this dissertation I report three doctoral research projects: the appli-
cation of imperfect certification in markets with asymmetric information,
the impact of elastic demand on market supplied product variety in dif-
ferentiated product markets and a microeconomic analysis of gift giving
when individuals are concerned with social approval (face). It consists of
six chapters including a general introduction, four research papers and an
outlook for further projects.
Chapter 2 proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect
testing technology. Such a technology only assures that whenever two
products are tested the higher quality product is more likely to pass than
the lower quality one. When only one certifier with such testing technol-
ogy is present in the market, it is found that this monopoly certifier can
be completely ignored in equilibrium, in contrast to the prediction of a
model with perfect testing technology. A separating equilibrium is also
supported in which only relatively high quality types (products) choose to
pay for the certification service. It is true that in such an equilibrium hav-
ing a certificate is better than not. The exact value of a certificate, however,
depends both on the prior distribution of product quality and the nature
of the testing technology. Welfare accounting shows that the monopoly
certifier’s profit maximizing conduct can lead to under or over supply
of certification service depending on model specification. Socially opti-
mal certification fee is always positive and such that it makes all positive
types choose to test. In the case of two competing certifiers with identical
testing technologies, the intuition of Bertrand competition does not neces-
sarily hold. Segmentation equilibrium wherein higher seller types choose
the more expensive certification service and not so high types choose the
less expensive service can be supported. As an application, we argue that
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the fee differentiation between major and non-major auditing firms need
not be a result of any differences in their auditing technologies.
Chapter 3 revisits the excess entry theorem in spatial models a` la Vickrey
(1964) and Salop (1979) while relaxing the assumption of inelastic de-
mand. Using a demand function with a constant demand elasticity, we
show that the number of firms that enter a market decreases with the
degree of demand elasticity. We find that the excess entry theorem does
only hold when demand is sufficiently inelastic. Otherwise, there is in-
sufficient entry. In the limiting case of unit elastic demand, the market
is monopolized. We point out when and how a public policy can be de-
sirable and broaden our results with a more general transportation cost
function. Chapter 4 generalizes on Chapter 3. We introduce consumers
with a generic quasi-linear utility function in the framework of the Salop
(1979) model. In addition to the results found in Chapter 3, we are able to
pin down conditions for efficient variety in entry cost and transportation
cost. A proof for the existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium
when price elasticity of demand is increasing in price is also provided.
Chapter 5 studies further into the warm-glow that donors may benefit from
their act of giving. Within the framework of concern for social approval,
we emphasize an individual’s relative position in social network and in-
troduce the concept of face. When individuals are concerned with face, the
wealthier will need to contribute more than the poorer in order to gain an
equal level of social approval. In aggregate, other things being equal, the
more individuals are concerned with face, the more they tend to donate.
While this approach is proposed in the context of social acceptance, it is
also applicable in morally motivated situations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation centers on three research topics: the application of im-
perfect certification in markets with asymmetric information, the impact
of elastic demand on market supplied product variety in differentiated
product markets and a microeconomic analysis of gift giving when indi-
viduals are concerned with social approval.
1.1 Asymmetric information and imperfect certifica-
tion
1.1.1 Asymmetric information and information intermediaries
The problem of asymmetric information in product quality was first brou-
ght to attention by George Akerlof (1970)’s classic paper of “The Market
for ‘Lemons’ ”. Since then this topic has grown into a large literature in
economics.1 Akerlof’s paper points out that when buyers have less knowl-
edge of product quality than sellers do, for example in a used car market,
because buyers are only willing to pay up to the value of the expected
quality of a product, sellers of high quality (reservation price) will opt out
from trading. Following this logic, in the end only low quality products
1According to Wikipedia, this paper has been citied more than 4,800 times in academic
papers as of October 2008. This data was retrieved from Google Scholar search on October
24, 2008.
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will remain in the market and if no one finds low quality products that
are worth buying, the market then breaks down.
This phenomenon at that time posed an enormous challenge to the classic
theory of general equilibrium which assumes full information and per-
fect competition. Subsequent periods have therefore witnessed a change
of style in which researches in economics are conducted: more papers
started looking at specific markets at hand. Observing that to varying
extents information asymmetry exists in virtually every market yet mar-
kets are still functioning, several explanations have been suggested in the
literature. There are models that allow sellers to signal product quality
via price, to build reputation in the long run, to provide quality insurance
through warranty, etc. Some others feature intermediaries. Particularly re-
lated to Chapter 2 are information intermediaries. In this type of models,
product quality in principle can be tested by a third party possibly with
costs. Depending on market characteristics, quality testing may mitigate
information asymmetry and improve market efficiency.
1.1.2 Perfect and imperfect certification
Several papers have studied markets with the presence of information
intermediaries, specifically, certifiers.2 Many of them, however, do not
investigate certifiers’ behavior. For instance, they are modeled as a public
authority providing quality tests for free. Such tests, however, can be
and in many cases are provided by private organizations. Therefore, the
investigation of certifiers’ incentives and conducts and the efficiency of
both product and certification markets will be the theme of Chapter 2. The
model that I am proposing is based on Lizzeri (1999). The difference and a
contribution of my work is the modeling of imperfect testing technologies.
Previous literature on strategic certifiers has been mainly interested in
certifiers with perfect testing technologies. However, tests that are prone
to mistakes are not only more realistic but also have consequential impacts
on certifiers and market performance.
With respect to the nature of certification results, I assume that a product
can either be certified or not. This is a simplification of the observation
that real life certification outcomes are normally discrete signals. Product
2A detailed literature review is provided in Chapter 2.
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quality, however, more often takes a value from a continuous interval. An
imperfect testing technology in this model is proposed in a way such that
it approves a higher quality product with a higher probability. It captures
the idea that certifiers with certain abilities or experiences in differenti-
ating product quality inevitably make honest but poor judgments. The
strategic aspect of imperfect certification comes in when certifiers try to
set a profit maximizing certification fee. Therefore, in the model there is
an endogenous price formation for both the product and the certification
service.
If we maintained everything in Chapter 2’s model except that certifiers
are assumed to have access to a perfect testing technology, i.e. they are
able to know the exact quality of a tested product, a summary of market
outcome would be as follows: In the monopoly certification service case,
the certifier only certifies products of positive qualities and charges a price
equal to the expected value of a certified product. Since buyers are paying
the same expected value to the sellers, the certifier, by exerting its power
of monopoly and ability of perfect testing, is able to obtain the entire
surplus generated in the product market and leave sellers and buyers
indifferent between trading and not trading. This result is completely
reverted when there are more than one certifier in the certification service
market. Competition between certifiers will drive market certification fee
to the marginal cost of testing or zero in this model. In the end, all
positive quality products get traded and sellers now enjoy the surplus
from product trading.
1.1.3 Main results in imperfect certification
Results when imperfect testing is introduced are no longer as extreme
as in the case of perfect testing. The main message from Chapter 2 is
that a little noise in the testing technology changes the certifier’s behavior
dramatically. Starting from a technology that only assures whenever two
products are tested, the higher quality product is more likely to pass
than the lower quality one, it is found that a monopoly certifier can be
completely ignored in equilibrium, in contrast to the enormous power a
perfect testing technology monopoly certifier has. It is also shown that a
separating equilibrium is supported wherein only relatively high quality
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types (products) choose to pay for the certification service. Hence, such
an imperfect testing technology can be useful in reducing information
asymmetry.
It is true that in a separating equilibrium having a certificate is better than
not. The exact value of a certificate, however, depends both on the prior
distribution of product quality and the nature of the testing technology.
With respect to market efficiency, analysis shows that the monopolistic
certifier’s profit maximizing conduct may lead to under- or oversupply of
certification service depending on model specification. A socially optimal
certification fee is always positive and such that it makes all positive types
choose to test.
In the case of two competing certifiers with identical testing technologies,
the intuition of Bertrand competition does not necessarily hold. A seg-
mentation equilibrium is found wherein higher seller types choose the
more expensive certification service and not so high types choose the less
expensive service can be supported. Finally, we apply this finding to the
financial auditing industry and argue that the fee differentiation between
major and non-major auditing firms need not be a result of any differences
in their auditing technologies. Our theoretical model sheds light on the
puzzle that quality difference in auditing services between high fee firms
and others is hard to identify empirically.
The model provided in Chapter 2 is fairly general yet it nevertheless leads
us to several concrete predictions. Arguably every test is imperfect and
it is realistic that anyone who looks at a quality certificate would have
doubts about the accuracy of the signal and sometimes even have a hard
time in understanding what such a certificate means. By constructing such
a model, I would like to emphasize the power of strategic thinking and
equilibrium analysis. By putting themselves in sellers’ shoes, consumers
know in a separating equilibrium that it does not pay for low quality
products to be tested. Therefore, a possibility of an imperfect certification
will at least exclude the really bad quality products. Certifiers, however,
understand that they need to keep certification price high to deter low
quality products yet are aware of the negative impact of a high price,
i.e. a low demand for certification service. Hence, only in equilibrium
will consumers and indeed certifiers have a refined knowledge of product
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quality. It is my hope that my model will help us understand more about
how tests that do not provide clear cut results and are prone to mistakes
have such a widespread use in real life. Its prediction in the duopoly case
is surprising yet reasonable. It offers a new perspective when we look at
the certification industry.
1.2 Production differentiation and the excess entry
theorem
1.2.1 Production differentiation
Equally important as market provided product quality is product variety.
Products that serve a common purpose can be very different in details.3
In general, differentiated products are provided in the market as a result
of producers catering to consumers with heterogeneous preferences. For
example, in the automobile market, two cars can be identical except one is
black and the other is red. Some consumers like the black car better than
the red one. Others have the opposite preference. There are, however,
many more colors in the color spectrum that some consumers may find
preferable to both black and red. A natural question to ask is how many
different colors (varieties) the market will provide. What are the most
important parameters that determine the market provided level of variety?
And of classic economic interests is to compare this level to the socially
efficient benchmark of product differentiation.
To answer the above questions and many more, three different modeling
approaches have been suggested in the literature. There are representa-
tive consumer models by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and
discrete choice models by Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1989). The
former relies on a representative consumer whose utility function encom-
passes all provided varieties. The latter takes a viewpoint of the producers
and model consumer choice of differentiated products as a random pro-
cess. With respect to the above mentioned questions, both approaches
pin down several variables including variables related to consumer pref-
3Commonly accepted in competition policy literature is that whether two products
belong to a single market is an empirical question of cross product price elasticities. In
this thesis, we follow the more traditional theoretical approach of product differentiation.
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erences and production costs. As expected, both market provided variety
and socially optimal level depend on model parameters and in general
either of these two may take a higher level.
There is another widely used approach of product differentiation with an
even longer history. Originally as a remedy to the instability of Bertrand
price competition, Hotelling (1929) first suggested a model with two firms
located in different positions on a line where consumers are uniformly dis-
tributed. Because almost all consumers have to incur transportation costs
when purchasing a product, a slight price variation only translates into
a small demand variation faced by the firms. As exemplified by many
subsequent papers, physical locations and transportation costs can be in-
terpreted as product characteristics and disutilities in consuming a less
preferred variety. In this sense, chocolates with different cacao levels can
be seen as if they are located at different locations along the line between
the lowest and highest cacao levels. Consumers may have different pref-
erences over chocolates with different cacao levels and consuming a less
favorite level incurs some disutility in taste.4 This approach is known as
location or address models.
In his 1979 article, Salop presented the ingenious idea of transforming the
unit Hotelling line into a unit circle to avoid boundary complexities. This
framework quickly found its power in analyzing firms’ entry decisions, a
topic the original Hotelling model finds difficult to address. In this model,
the basic ingredients of the Hotelling model remain except when there are
more than two firms in the market, firms located closest to the two ends
of the Hotelling line are now in principle no more different than any other
firms. If we look at a Salop circle with uniformly distributed consumers
and equidistantly located single variety firms, for a given number of firms,
we can calculate their profits in the price equilibrium. A firm then only
enters if the profit it expects to earn outweighs its cost of entry. Applying
zero profit condition under free entry, we will then have an endogenous
market provided level of product variety.
4Here, an important assumption with respect to consumer preference is its unimod-
ularity. That is, if a consumer has his most preferred variety at location xm, then to the
left of xm he prefers x2 over x1 as long as x1 < x2 < xm and to the right of xm he prefers
x3 over x4 as long as xm < x3 < x4.
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1.2.2 The excess entry theorem
Determinants of the market level of product variety are the parameters
that represent consumer disutility in consuming a less preferred variety,
also known as the transportation cost, and firms’ entry cost, commonly
modeled as the fixed cost of establishing a new business. As the only
two major exogenous parameters in the original Salop model, the socially
efficient level of product variety depends only on consumer transportation
cost and the fixed cost of entry. As shown in Tirole (1988), in this model
market provided product variety is always larger than the socially efficient
level. In other words, there is always an excess of entry into the market.
A similar point was raised by Vickrey (1964). The intuition of this result
is that competition between firms are localized and firms will not stop
entering until even with their local monopoly power they can only make
a profit just to cover their fixed cost of entry. This also explains why the
other two approaches are able to produce insufficient entry as in these
models competition is global.5
Several papers have checked the robustness of this excess entry theorem.
Already shown in Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) is that the excess
entry result is quite robust against different functional forms of the trans-
portation cost. For example, it holds under power transportation cost.
With respect to the production cost, Matsumura and Okamura (2006) find
the result holds for quite general cost structures. Given its robustness,
it seems that if a researcher decides to use a Salop model, he/she also
“decides” that there is excess entry. Are spatial models then incapable of
conducting welfare analyses?
1.2.3 Elastic demand in spatial models
Chapter 3 and 4, coauthored with Tobias Wenzel, weigh in on this long
established theorem of excess entry. We argue that it is inadequate to
represent consumer preferences only by transportation costs, a seemingly
trivial point. By focusing only on transportation cost, one assumes each
consumer only demands a fixed amount of the differentiated product, no
matter what the price is. But for many products, consumer demanded
5See, for instance, Anderson and de Palma (2000).
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quantity responses to price changes, hence, demand is generally elastic.6
Examples include chocolates, beer and many other consumer products.
Therefore, we revisit the classic spatial model by introducing elastic con-
sumer demand. The main impact of elastic demand is on market compe-
tition of firms, that is, on their pricing behavior. In turn, it impacts on
firms’ profits and ultimately their entry decisions.
To implement this idea, in chapter 3 we first propose a demand function
with constant elasticity. This allows us to bring in one more parameter
into the model in a tractable manner. With elastic demand, when firms
choose their product price, they not only compete for a larger market
share but also have to consider their own customers’ individual demands.
A low price then increases both a firm’s market share and its customers’
individual demands. We found that in the price equilibrium of any given
number of competing firms, each firm makes a lower profit than it would
have under inelastic demand. Hence under free entry, there are less firms
in the market. Indeed, the higher the demand elasticity is, the lower the
equilibrium number of firms in the market. However, since the socially
optimal number of firms under the first best benchmark is independent of
price elasticity, it remains unchanged.7 In consequence, it is shown that
there exists a threshold level of demand elasticity below which there is
excess entry in the market while above which there is insufficient entry.
When the demand elasticity approaches zero, we then of course go back
to the classic Salop model and as expected there is always excess entry.
We believe that the insight in chapter 3 also applies in much more general
cases. Constant elasticity is a very unrealistic and restrictive assumption
and, in principle, demand elasticity should be found in price equilibria for
general demand functions. Thus, we are interested in finding out what
really determines market entry without assuming an exogenously given
demand elasticity. Chapter 4 does exactly that. We start with a very gen-
eral demand function and identify price equilibrium demand elasticity
6For lacking of a better term, by “elastic” we mean consumer demand varies in product
price instead of being fixed. We are aware that commonly in industrial organization
literature, a level of demand is called elastic if the demand elasticity evaluated at this
level is found to be larger than 1 and inelastic when it is less than 1.
7Under first best benchmark, the optimal level of entry is found when a regulator
can also control product price besides the number of firms. We also do a second best
benchmark comparison in which the regulator can only control market entry leaving
product price endogenously determined in a price equilibrium.
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and the associated firms’ profits by implicit functions. We then pin down
the endogenous equilibrium number of firms under free entry by trans-
portation cost and fixed cost. We show that there are cases in which when
the fixed cost is low enough there is excess entry and when high enough
there is insufficient entry. Reformulated in terms of transportation cost,
there is excess entry when it is high enough and insufficient entry when
it is low enough. These results are quite intuitive but previously eluded
researchers.
As we have shown, once elastic demand is considered, market entry or
market provided product varieties can be either excessive or insufficient,
depending on model parameters. This finding closes the gap between
spatial models and the other two approaches in the literature of product
differentiation when efficient level variety is considered. Our model in
chapter 4 also provides a framework for researchers in search of a spatial
model suitable for the market at hand and who would like to investigate
welfare issues. As we notice in the literature, the traditional Salop model
is used in several welfare analyses, we would like to call for more attention
to consumer demand structure before such analyses are carried out.8
1.3 Charitable giving and concern for face
1.3.1 Motivations of charitable giving
Departing from topics in industrial economics, Chapter 5 covers a subject
that has relevance both in economics and sociology: charitable giving.
There are several theories offered in the economics literature on volun-
tary contribution to charities. When charity is viewed as a public good,
some individuals may have a preference on the level of the good that
is provided. As long as the amount of provided public good remains
unchanged, they may not care who contributes how much. Along with
this pure altruism theory, there is the impure altruism theory in which
individuals also care about whether he himself has contributed or not.
Within this impure altruism theory, a distinction of “prestige benefit” ver-
sus “intrinsic benefit” of one’s own act of giving, based on whether such
8Reference to previous welfare analyses in spatial models is given in chapter 4.
9
an act is visible to others or not, has been proposed in recent works. In-
tuitively, if one is after the “prestige benefit”, other individuals should
at least be able to know about his donation. If visibility does not matter
for a donor, then the motivation behind his impure altruistic behavior is
more likely to be the “intrinsic benefit” from donating. Various empirical
findings based on statical, survey or experiment data have supported the
hypothesis of impure altruism, although most of them do not differentiate
between “prestige benefit” and “intrinsic benefit”. A more comprehensive
literature review is provided in the introduction section of chapter 5.
Although most researchers agree that individuals’ enjoyment of “joy of
giving” is an important incentive to make voluntary donations, the na-
ture of this “joy” or “warm glow” is relatively underinvestigated. Using
MRI scans of subjects’ brains, Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart (2007) find
that voluntary financial transfers to public goods increase neural activi-
ties in areas linked to reward processing. Compared to a consumption
of a physical good, there is less understanding of such a consumption of
“voluntary donation” that triggers reward process in a brain. More likely,
this reward process is influenced by many more factors than a reward
process triggered by a consumption of gourmet food or narcotics. Many
of these factors are very subjective. What is the minimal level of dona-
tion that would trigger such a process? By how much more donation a
certain measure of such activity in a brain will be increased? How about
information? Will we observe a higher level of activity when the subject
is told he is the most generous donor than otherwise?
1.3.2 Concern for face
Chapter 5 presents a theory of how different donations are translated into
individual utilities and gives predictions on human behavior based on
equilibrium analysis. I introduce the concept of “face” from sociology lit-
erature which, in economics terms, is a case of interdependent preference.
Each individual according to his ranking of wealth occupies a relative
position in his social network. At a given position, the more he donates
the more he enjoys “joy of giving”. A key point is, nominal donations
from different positions have different “exchange rates” or “prices” for
subjective hedonic enjoyment. The same amount of donation by a poor
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individual gives him a higher level of “reward” than it gives a wealthy
person. Presumably, neural activities in a brain is influenced by this per-
son’s information of own wealth. Another important point is that such
a production of “joy of giving” is also interdependent. When others are
donating generously, the same amount of donation gives an individual at
a given position less enjoyment than when others’ donations are smaller.
This idea is represented by an average donation/income ratio which is
determined in equilibrium. In summary, in a model of individuals with
concern for face, the average donation/income ratio functions as a refer-
ence point but is adjusted by individuals’ relative positions in the social
network. In equilibrium, richer individuals donate more in terms of abso-
lute amount and have higher donation/income ratio since they are already
expected to donate more.
The negative externality of one individual’s donation to others’ enjoyment
of “warm glow” was studied in Glazer and Konrad (1996) in a signaling
model in which a higher donation level can be seen as a signal of higher
income in equilibrium. Therefore, when others are donating generously,
a rich individual needs to donate even more to signal his income. In
the current model, externality comes from individuals’ concern for face.
When others are donating more, it will make one look bad or lose face.
This negative externality explains the model predictions on government
subsidy for donation expenses, for instance via a tax refund. It is found
in chapter 5 a government subsidy will increase the aggregate amount of
donation more than the cost to the government. In this case, real cost of
donation for individuals decreases so every one donates more. But higher
individual donation also generates negative externalities to others and in
the end every one donates much more. Individuals will also have a lower
utility level because of a much lower level of other consumptions. By
a similar reasoning, government tax of individual donation will increase
their utility.9
Chapter 5 is a new explanation of charitable giving with a special interest
on the interactions of individual giving. With a few exceptions, the liter-
ature so far is mainly interested in modeling, theorizing, confirming and
9In the model, individual utilities from aggregate supply of donated public goods are
absent. Therefore, these results with respect to public policies should be interpreted with
caution.
11
estimating the “demand” for “warm glow”. My model attempts to pro-
vide us with a better understanding of the “supply” side of “warm glow”,
hence to have a better understanding of individuals’ charitable behavior.
After the above introduced chapters, this thesis concludes with a chapter
on an outlook for future research projects.
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Chapter 2
Imperfect Certification
2.1 Introduction
Consider a market in which sellers know more about product quality
than buyers do as in Akerlof (1970). It is well understood that serious
consequences including market breakdown may result from information
asymmetry in this fashion. Other than building up reputation (Klein and
Leﬄer, 1981) and providing warranty (Grossman, 1981), sellers sometimes
resort to third-party intermediaries. This chapter studies such markets
featuring one type of pure information intermediaries known as certi-
fiers.1 By using a testing technology certifiers normally are able to assess
the quality of tested products. After the assessment, a certifier decides
whether to grant the tested product a certificate. With the additional
information of a product’s certification status, buyers should then know
more about its quality. Examples of such certification services are numer-
ous. Laboratories test and certify consumer products; credit rating agen-
cies assign credit ratings to issuers of debt obligations; universities issue
diploma to students who meet their graduation criteria; educational test-
ing services carry out tests evaluating testees’ scholastic aptitudes;2 many
1Intermediaries who buy and sell products may also improve buyers’ information on
product quality. This point is studied in Biglaiser (1993) and Biglaiser and Friedman
(1994).
2The Educational Testing Service (ETS) is, of course, one of such institutions.
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software solution companies also run certification programs of technical
expertise through which job applicants can obtain relevant credentials.3
In studies of certification markets, more significantly so in those with
strategic certifiers, it is often assumed that a perfect testing technology is
available to the certifiers. That is, they are able to know the exact quality
of each tested product without a single mistake. Though this simplifica-
tion is helpful to many other research topics, it is of both practical and
theoretical interest to see how certifiers set prices and how markets per-
form when testing technologies are imperfect. Justifications for imperfect-
ness in testing technologies are as many as the applications. Laboratories
make honest mistakes in certifying consumer products; credit rating agen-
cies only have imperfect knowledge about debt issuers’ credit worthiness;
there are cases that students fail to graduate because of non-productivity
related factors; and luck plays a role in any expertise certification process.
Yet, real life experiences indicate that those certification services are help-
ful in reducing information asymmetry. For example, a university degree
usually is a good signal of a worker’s ability although some students may
have obtained their degrees just out of luck and some high ability students
failed to graduate.
Many certification services are imperfect but effective in differentiating
products of different qualities. This chapter attempts to model such cer-
tification technologies in a general way. Our main assumption is the fol-
lowing: tested by such a technology, a product may or may not pass but
for any two products the higher quality one has a higher probability than
the lower quality one to pass. In the context of education, it amounts
to say that a student may or may not graduate from a university but for
any two students the one of the higher ability is more likely to succeed
in earning a diploma than the other. As shown in the following, when
utilized, such a testing technology is sufficient to render a certification
service informative although only to a limited extent.
3Currently Microsoft runs four such certification programs: Microsoft Certified Tech-
nology Specialist (MCTS), Professional Developer (MCPD), IT Professional (MCITP) and
Architect (MAC). Many other software companies such as Sun, Cisco, Oracle, etc., provide
their own certification service.
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2.1.1 Main results
The deviation from perfect certification generates new results. For ex-
ample, a monopoly certifier with an imperfect technology can now be
completely ignored, in contrast to the prediction of a model with perfect
testing technology. A certificate is informative in a separating equilibrium
in which only relatively high quality types (products) choose to pay for
the certification service. Though having a certificate is preferable, the ex-
act value of a certificate depends both on the product quality distribution
and the nature of the testing technology. Welfare accounting shows that
the monopolistic certifier’s profit maximizing conduct can lead to under
or over supply of certification service depending on model specification.
Optimal certification fee is always positive and such that it makes all pos-
itive types choose to test.
In the duopoly case, the intuition of Bertrand competition between two
identical suppliers (of certificates) need not hold. Facing two certifiers
with identical but imperfect testing technologies, higher seller types may
choose the certifier who charges the higher fee and not so high types
choose the other. In such a segmentation equilibrium, neither the lower
fee certifier nor the higher fee one monopolizes the entire market of test-
ing. Moreover, lowering one’s certification fee does not necessarily gen-
erate a higher demand nor a higher profit. This observation suggests the
possibility of positive profits for both certifiers even when their testing
technologies are essentially identical. Consequently, competition need not
drive the certification fee to zero which would be the case if both certifiers
had perfect testing technologies (see Lizzeri 1999). Applied to the case of
financial auditing services, we cannot rule out the possibility that auditors
charging vastly different fees may have similar auditing abilities.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
related literature and section 2.3 sets up the model. Section 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6
investigate the monopoly case and section 2.7 the duopoly case. Section
2.8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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2.2 Related literature
There are a few studies of strategic certifiers, but mostly with perfect test-
ing technologies. Lizzeri (1999) builds up a canonical model of certifiers
upon which our model is constructed. In that paper the model is used to
study certifiers’ strategic behavior in information revelation assuming that
they are able to know the exact value of every tested product’s quality.
Based on a similar model, Albano and Lizzeri (2001) investigate sellers’
incentive in quality provision when the possibility of certification is avail-
able and the certifier may reveal the quality information in a strategic way.
Strausz (2005) studies another important aspect of certification service,
namely the credibility of certifiers. Our model on the other hand, focuses
on certifier’s testing technology. We propose a general representation of
imperfect testing technology that only requires a few basic assumptions.
By constructing our model on Lizzeri (1999)’s perfect testing model, we’ll
be able to do a direct comparison of respective results and highlight the
implication of imperfectness in testing technologies.4
Imperfect testing technology is studied in some other papers of certifica-
tion markets. In this strand of literature, however, certifiers do not strate-
gically set their prices and there are normally only two possible levels of
product quality, either high or low. These papers include, for example,
Heinkel (1981), De and Nabar (1991), and Mason and Sterbenz (1994).
Heinkel (1981) investigates sellers’ incentive in improving product quality
in a setup with exogenously provided imperfect tests. Mason and Ster-
benz (1994) analyze how imperfect test affects market size. Compared to
De and Nabar’s (1991) paper, which like ours also studies the equilibria
of certification markets with imperfect testing technologies, we introduce
strategic certifiers and allow product quality to be drawn from a contin-
uous interval. A shortcoming of limiting quality space to a binary set in
modeling imperfect certification is that in an information-revealing sepa-
rating equilibrium the testing technology becomes “perfect”.
Hvide (2005) models strategic certifiers and introduces a zero-mean, nor-
mally distributed error term into testing technology. When a product is
tested by this technology, a certifier observes the sum of its true quality
4It has to be noted that in this chapter we are mainly interested in testing technologies.
We do not model certifier’s strategic behavior in information revelation.
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and the realization of a white noise. If this reading exceeds the certifier’s
passing score, the tested product will be awarded a certificate. Modeled
in this way, as it is in Hvide (2005), for any given passing score such
a technology exhibits the property of our approach, namely, the higher
the tested product quality is, the more likely it passes. This “measure-
ment error” approach hence amounts to a special case of our modeling of
imperfect testing technology.5
In a setting of rating agencies, Boom (2001) assumes an investment project’s
probability of getting a favorable rating is the same as its success prob-
ability.6 With this rating technology, she shows that in a market with
a monopolistic rating agency there can be over or under supply of rat-
ing services compared to the socially optimal level. Though differing in
details, our work shows that both market provision and socially optimal
level of certification service depend on product quality distribution and
the testing technology; we also establish a necessary condition for mar-
ket equilibrium to be socially optimal and show that when this condition
is not satisfied market either undersupplies or oversupplies certification
service depending on model specification.
To explain the significant fee differentiation between major and non-major
auditing firms in financial service market, Hvide (2005) argues major au-
diting firms adopt stricter test standards (higher passing scores in the
“measurement error” approach) than non-major auditing firms. With the
help of the stricter standards, major auditing firms are then able to charge
higher auditing fees and make higher profits. In this chapter we provide
an alternative explanation. In our model, we need not assume differences
in their auditing processes. Even with identical standards, i.e., identical
tests, Bertrand Competition need not happen and segmentation equilib-
rium may be supported in which firms charge different prices.
5Note that the reading gives the expected quality of the tested product. The certifiers
have incentive to reveal more information than just the certificate. For instance, revealing
the reading itself can attract testees. In our current model, however, this information is
not available to the certifiers.
6It will become clear in the following that this is also a special case of our modeling
of imperfect testing technology, namely G(t) = t. See Equation (2.1) in Section 2.3.
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2.3 The model
Following the setup of Lizzeri (1999), we analyze the market situation as
a non-cooperative game with incomplete information.
2.3.1 Players
We have four players in the model, one seller, one certifier and two buyers.
The seller wants to sell a product to the buyers. The product has a value
equal to its quality t (type) to both of the buyers but is worth nothing
to the seller and the certifier. The type t is originally only known to the
seller; the buyers and the certifier, however, know the prior distribution of
t represented by cumulative distribution function, F(t). F(t) is assumed
to be continuous, differentiable and strictly increasing on interval [a, b],
where a < 0 < b.7 The associated density function is denoted f (t). The
seller has the possibility to get the product tested by the certifier.
The certifier has a testing technology. When it is used to test the product,
it prints out a certificate (C) with probability
Pr(C ∣ t) = G(t), (2.1)
conditional on t. G(t) is also assumed to be continuous, differentiable and
strictly increasing on [a, b] with first derivative denoted g(t). Tested by
this technology, the higher a product’s quality is the higher its probability
of receiving a certificate will be. Naturally the probability of no certificate
(NC) is Pr(NC ∣ t) = 1 − G(t). This setup requires function G(t) to
be bounded below by 0 and above by 1. For convenience, we assume
G(a) = 0 and G(b) = 1, i.e., it is not possible for the lowest type to pass
the test while the highest type always passes when tested.8 It is also
assumed that the certifier does not manipulate the test result produced
by the technology. The certifier can charge a certification fee P for the test
and the cost associated with testing is normalized to zero.
Both buyers observe whether a product possesses a certificate or not and
bid simultaneously based on their beliefs. They, however, cannot distin-
7When product quality is negative, consumption of such goods harms the buyers.
8This assumption does not change our results qualitatively.
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guish the event that the product was not tested from the event that the
product failed the test. That is, they observe if a product has a certificate,
θ : θ ∈ {C,NC}, but not what the seller did.
2.3.2 Timing
Stage 1 The certifier announces its certification fee, P, for the test.
Stage 2 At the beginning, the seller learns his type t (chosen by nature
according to F(⋅)) and the announced certification fee, P; the seller
then decides whether or not to get the product tested by paying the
certifier the certification fee.
Stage 3 If the seller chooses to test, then the certifier employs the testing
technology and the seller receives a certificate with probability G(t),
receives no certificate with probability 1− G(t).
Stage 4 Both buyers observe P and if the product has a certificate or not.
Stage 5 Buyers bid independently and simultaneously for the product.
The product is sold to the buyer who bids higher than the other at
the price of the winning bid. Buyers get the product equally likely
in case of a tie. When both bids are zero, the product is not sold.
2.3.3 Strategies
The certifier’s strategy is simply the choice of certification fee, P ∈ R+.
The seller’s strategy specifies his decision for all combinations of own
quality type and certification fee level. Namely, it is a function
ρ(P, t), from R+ × [a, b] to {TS,NTS}, that maps the vector (P, t)
into a set of two elements, to test or not to test.
A strategy for a buyer is a function β(P, θ), from R+ × {C,NC} to R+,
that maps the announced certification fee and the product’s certifi-
cation status to a bid for that product. Buyers’ beliefs are denoted by
µ(t ∣ C, P) for a certified product and µ(t ∣ NC, P) for a non-certified
product. Since buyers have identical information, when beliefs are
Bayesian updatable they are identical. Note that competition will
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make them both bid up to their common belief. Therefore, no sub-
scripts are used for individual buyers.
2.3.4 Payoffs
All players are assumed to be risk neutral. Hence, they maximize their
payoffs in expected terms.
A buyer’s payoff function, in the following three types of outcomes, reads
U(t, β) =
⎧⎨⎩
t− β(P,NC) when the buyer gets a non-certified product,
t− β(P,C) when the buyer gets a certified product,
0 when the buyer does not get the product.
The seller receives buyers’ bids for a non-certified product when the
product is not tested. If the seller chooses to test, he has a prob-
ability of G(t) getting a certificate and receiving buyers’ bids for
a certified product. In other cases (1− G(t)), he does not get the
certificate and receives bids for a non-certified product. Taking the
certification fee into account, the seller’s payoff is
V(ρ, t, P, β) =
⎧⎨⎩ β(P,NC) not to test,[1− G(t)]β(P,NC) + G(t)β(P,C)− P to test.
The certifier’s payoff is the product of the certification fee and the de-
mand for the certification service, i.e.,
Π(P, ρ) = P ⋅ Pr(the event that the seller tests),
or
Π(P, ρ) = P ⋅
∫
T
dF(t), where T = {t ∣ ρ(P, t) = TS}.
2.3.5 Equilibrium notion
The equilibrium notion employed in this chapter is Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium. As we argued before competition between the buyers will force
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them bid identically up to their common belief, we have
β∗(P, θ) =
⎧⎨⎩ µ(t ∣ θ, P) if µ(t ∣ θ, P) ≥ 0,0 otherwise. (2.2)
Bayesian perfectness requires their expectations should be consistent with
equilibrium outcome. Hence, for both buyers, when their beliefs are
Bayesian updatable,
µ(t ∣ θ, P) = E(t ∣ θ, P), ∀θ ∈ {C,NC}, ∀P ∈ R+, (2.3)
where E is the mathematical expectation operator. We also need that
the seller not to have incentive in deviating from equilibrium strategy
after knowing his quality type. The seller’s strategy choice should be, for
each type, his best response to the announced certification fee and buyers’
biding strategies. Therefore, for any given combination of certification fee
P and buyers bidding function β, we need
V(ρ∗, t, P, β) ≥ V(ρ′, t, P, β), ∀t ∈ [a, b], where ρ′ = {TS,NTS} ∖ {ρ∗}.
(2.4)
The certifier’s fee should then be chosen to maximize his expected payoff,
P∗ = argmax
{
P ⋅
∫
{t∣ρ(P,t)=TS}
dF(t)
}
. (2.5)
Formally we define the equilibrium notion as the following.
Definition 2.1. A strategy profile {P∗, ρ∗(P, t), β∗(P, θ)} and buyers’ belief
µ(t ∣ θ, P), constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game, if and only
if conditions (2.2), (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) hold.
2.3.6 Discussion
The testing technology (2.1) essentially only requires whenever two prod-
ucts get tested, the product that is of the higher quality has a higher
probability than the other to pass. It doesn’t specify any functional form.
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2.4 Monopoly: bypassing
In the situation depicted in section 2.3, without certification service infor-
mation asymmetry leads to market breakdown when the prior expectation
of product quality is below zero, E(t) < 0. When E(t) > 0, however, the
product is traded with probability one. From social welfare point of view,
there is over-trading since there are cases trading results in a loss to the
society.9
With perfect testing technology, for example, as in Lizzeri (1999), it is
found that a monopoly certifier will only certify non-negative seller types;
hence, only those certified types will be traded in equilibrium. This is
an efficient outcome since all positive types are traded while none of the
negative types will be. It is also shown that the mere existence of this
perfect testing possibility grants the certifier the power to take away the
entire market surplus leaving the seller a payoff of zero. Consequently,
the monopolist’s interest is coincident with social welfare.10 This explains
why the monopolist’s profit maximizing conduct is also socially optimal.
When the testing technology is imperfect, however, the game changes
dramatically with respect to both the monopoly certifier’s power and the
market outcome. Although with perfect testing technology the certifier
can always guarantee itself the demand for certification service by offering
to the seller that it will reveal the exact quality type of a tested product,
when testing technology is imperfect the certifier may even be completely
bypassed.
Proposition 2.1. Any of the following strategy profiles, such that,
1. for all levels of the certification fee, all seller types choose not to test,
2. for all levels of certification fee, buyers bid for a non-certified product either
the ex ante expected quality when it is positive or zero when non-positive,
bid for a certified product either the belief for a certified product when it is
positive or zero when non-positive,
3. the certifier charges any non-negative fee,
9The lowest type a is assumed to be less than 0. Therefore, some negative types will
be traded. When a ≥ 0, full trading is efficient.
10Note that buyers always end up with zero payoff because they engage in Bertrand
bidding competition.
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4. and the buyers’ belief being that the quality of a certified product is no
higher than the ex ante expected quality,
constitutes an equilibrium. That is,
P∗ = P ∈ R+
ρ∗(P, t) = NTS, ∀t ∈ [a, b], ∀P ∈ R+
β∗(P,NC) = max{E(t), 0}, ∀P ∈ R+
β∗(P,C) = max{µ(t ∣ C, P), 0}, ∀P ∈ R+
µ(t ∣ NC, P) = E(t), ∀P ∈ R+
µ(t ∣ C, P) = µ ∈ (a, E(t)], ∀P ∈ R+.
Proof. See Appendix.
One direct implication of Proposition 2.1 is the following remark.
Remark 2.1. When testing technology is imperfect, it’s possible for the seller to
bypass the monopoly certifier.
The main underlying reason for this result is the strictly positive probabil-
ity that lower types may pass the test. This leaves the buyers the scope of
forming the beliefs that are required for the equilibria in Proposition 2.1.
In the perfect testing technology case, such beliefs cannot be supported;
consequently, bypassing is not possible.
This difference between perfect and imperfect testing technology is not
only of theoretical interest but also of practical importance. Consider “a”
seller in the literal sense. Before nature’s draw, there are collective interests
among seller types. We can think of a monopoly seller or an industry in
aggregation. From this perspective, when E(t) ≤ 0, it is not in the seller’s
interest to bypass the certification service because there would then be
no trading. When E(t) > 0, however, the seller makes maximal profit
E(t) without the certification service. Given that the testing technology is
imperfect, it’s at least possible for the seller to bypass the certifier.
We are aware that buyers’ belief in Proposition 2.1 seems irregular. It
essentially says that a certificate does not serve a signal of high quality
even though buyers know that when tested higher types are more likely
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to obtain a certificate than lower types. First of all, when the certification
service is not used, the beliefs stated in Proposition 2.1 are not exactly
irrational. Second, the reason we present Proposition 2.1 in this chapter
is to show the difference in feasible equilibria when testing technology is
perfect versus when it is imperfect. Although we can put more restrictions
on buyers’ beliefs by adopting other equilibrium notions, this possibility
result signifies the decrease of certifier’s power caused by imperfectness
in testing technology.
2.5 Monopoly: separating equilibrium
In the following we search out those equilibria in which there is a positive
measure of seller types paying for the test. This is of particularly impor-
tance when E(t) ≤ 0 since in this case the market would break down if
there were no certification service available. To focus on this issue and to
simplify the analysis, we assume the prior expected product quality to be
negative.11
Assumption 2.1. The prior expected product quality is less than zero, i.e.,
E(t) ≤ 0.
As an example, consider the labor market for IT specialists. If there are no
other signals available and the average potential worker does not qualify,
then a certificate for such expertise would be crucial both to job applicants
and to employers. Yet, we need to find out for a given imperfect testing
technology what a certificate could mean and how the market for the
certification service performs.
We solve the game by investigating first the subgames induced by different
certification fees. Not surprisingly, when the certification fee is set too
high, it does not pay for the seller to get the product tested. The following
proposition states.
Proposition 2.2. In subgames induced by the certifier’s fee setting P, it is true
that:
11Again, this assumption does not change the result on separating equilibrium quali-
tatively.
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1. if the certifier charges a fee higher than the highest type, then any strategy
profile such that all seller types choosing not to test, buyers bidding zero for
a non-certified, bidding for a certified product the belief for such a product
when it is positive or zero when non-positive, and buyers’ beliefs for a
certified product being no higher than b, constitutes an equilibrium in the
subgame induced by P; that is, in subgames where P > b,
ρ∗(t ∣ P > b) = NTS, ∀t ∈ [a, b]
β∗(NC ∣ P > b) = 0
β∗(C ∣ P > b) = max{µ(t ∣ C, P > b), 0}
µ(t ∣ NC, P > b) = E(t)
µ(t ∣ C, P > b) = µ ∈ (a, b];
2. if the certifier charges a fee equal to the highest type, there is only one
equilibrium in the subgame other than bypassing, in which only the highest
seller type chooses to test and buyers bid the value of the highest type for a
certified product, zero for a non-certified product and buyers’ beliefs being
the ex ante expectation for a non-certified product and b for a certified
product; that is, in the subgame where P = b,
ρ∗(t = b ∣ P = b) = TS and ρ∗(t ∣ P = b) = NTS, ∀t ∈ [a, b)
β∗(C ∣ P = b) = b and β∗(NC ∣ P = b) = 0
µ(C ∣ P = b) = b and µ(NC ∣ P = b) = E(t).
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result can be interpreted as the following. When the price for test is
too high, there is intuitively not much demand for it. As a preparation for
solving the whole game, we establish the following corollary with respect
to the certifier’s profit. The result is immediate from Proposition 2.2.
Corollary 2.1. The certifier makes zero profit by setting P ≥ b, or P = 0.
25
2.5.1 Separating equilibrium
We now turn to the more interesting subgames induced by intermediate
certification fees. Before proceeding to the result, the following definition
is useful in simplifying notation.
Definition 2.2. Denote
Ω(m, n) =
∫ n
m tG(t)dF(t)∫ n
m G(t)dF(t)
for a ≤ m < n ≤ b.
Function Ω(m, n) gives type expectation of a product with a certificate if and
only if all types from the interval (m, n] (or (m, n), [m, n), [m, n]) choose to test.
Further we introduce the following tie-breaking rule.
Assumption 2.2. When a seller type is indifferent between to test and not to
test, we assume he chooses to test.
Proposition 2.3 (Separating). In each subgame induced by 0 < P < b, there
is a unique subgame equilibrium other than bypassing the certifier completely.
Moreover, the set of seller types, which strictly prefer testing, is of the form
(x, b] and type x is indifferent between testing and not testing, where x solves
G(x)Ω(x, b) = P. Buyers bid β(P,C) = Ω(x, b) for a certified product and
β(P,NC) = 0 for a non-certified product. That is,
the seller’s strategies:
⎧⎨⎩ ρ
∗(t ∣ P) = TS, ∀t ∈ [x, b],
ρ∗(t ∣ P) = NTS, ∀t ∈ [a, x),
buyer’s strategies:
⎧⎨⎩ β
∗(C ∣ P) = Ω(x, b),
β∗(NC ∣ P) = 0,
and buyer’s expectation:
⎧⎨⎩ µ(t,C ∣ P) = Ω(x, b),µ(t,NC ∣ P) < 0.
constitute the equilibrium in the subgame induced by P ∈ (0, b).
Proof. See Appendix.
This result states that for each positive certification fee that is less than
the highest quality type, there is a unique subgame equilibrium in which
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those relatively high types choose to test by paying the certification fee
while relatively low types choose not to.12 Since only those higher types
choose to test, after taking the imperfectness in the testing technology
into account, buyers still bid more for a product that has a certificate.
This bidding difference justifies the fee that high seller types pay for the
test. The probability of a type passing the test is critical to the type’s
willingness to pay. Even high types have a certain probability failing a
test. But the nature of the testing technology ensures that in expected
terms higher types are better off by paying for the test while lower types
are better off by choosing not to test.
For ease of exposition and motivated by the proof of Proposition 2.3 in
Appendix 2.9.3, we introduce the next definition.
Definition 2.3. Denote κ(P) = x such that G(x)Ω(x, b) = P where 0 < P < b.
For a given P, κ(P) gives the unique type who is indifferent between to test and
not to test in the equilibrium identified in Proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.3 states that in equilibrium all types higher than κ(P) prefer
paying for the test and playing the certification lottery over not to test. The
difference for any type t between these two options can be represented by
function Γ(t), 13
Γ(t) = G(t)Ω (κ(P), b)− P.
While Γ(κ(P)) = 0,
Γ(t ∣ t > κ(P)) = G(t ∣ t > κ(P))Ω(κ(P), b)− P
> G(κ(P))Ω(κ(P), b)− P = Γ(κ(P)) = 0.
This explains that the set of the seller types who pay for the test is al-
ways connected. Whenever a certain type finds it worthwhile paying for
the test, any type above would find it so as well. For the same fee, a
higher type gets a better lottery than a lower type. On the other hand,
this guarantees the existence of the separating equilibrium by preventing
lower types from applying the test. A certification service provides a de-
vice by which relatively high seller types can separate themselves from
12Note that bypassing is still possible but in this section we focus on the cases when
the certification service is used.
13See also Equation (2.17) in 2.9.3.
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relatively low types. They also need to pool together to induce buyers to
form a quality expectation that is positive. In the case of perfect testing
technology, however, pooling is not necessarily needed since a certifier
can certify a seller’s true type. From the perspective of the seller, we have
the following remark.
Remark 2.2. 1. When there is no testing technology, seller types’ interests
are all pooled together without choice;
2. when there is a perfect testing technology, an individual seller type has the
opportunity to perfectly identify itself unilaterally;
3. when there is an imperfect testing technology, seller types depend on each
other to a certain degree.
Recall that in the case of perfect testing technology the certifier is able to
make all tested types indifferent between testing and not testing and take
away the entire market surplus. The certifier chooses a minimum quality
standard, say κ′ = 0, and charges P′ = E(t ∣ t ≥ 0) for the test. It turns
out that types above 0 are all indifferent between testing and not testing.
Note that even though each seller type is left with zero surplus, this is
the unique equilibrium when perfect testing technology is available in the
monopoly certifier case.14
Suppose that a certifier with an imperfect technology wants to employ
such a strategy. The certifier claims that all types higher than κ′ will
pass the test while all types below will not. Since the certifier is unable
to make sure that every low type does not pass and every high type
passes, the expected quality of a certified product is not assured to be at
E(t ∣ t ≥ κ′). Therefore, buyers will not bid as much as E(t ∣ t ≥ κ′) and
neither will the seller types pay as much for the test. So it is clear that
when testing technology is imperfect, a monopoly certifier cannot take
away the entire market surplus. Indeed most of the testing seller types
derive strictly positive payoff in a separating equilibrium. The following
remark summaries.
14For a formal reasoning, the reader is referred to Lizzeri (1999). This situation re-
sembles the observation that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a 2-player
Ultimatum game, the proposer gets all and the other gets nothing even though she can
reject.
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Remark 2.3. When imperfect certification service is used in equilibrium, the
monopoly certifier’s power in taking up market surplus against the seller is limited
compared to the case in which a perfect testing technology is available.
2.5.2 Value of a certificate
It is worth noting how buyers form their expectations towards a certified
product. Without equilibrium analysis a certificate does not give a defini-
tive meaning in terms of product quality. Proposition 2.3, however, says
only types higher than or equal to κ(P) go to the certifier in equilibrium
at the cost of a positive fee. By successfully attracting a positive measure
of seller types, the certification service practically blocks away types lower
than κ(P) in the original population and filters the remaining into a new
population of those with a certificate. The new population is distributed
on [κ(P), b] with density G(t) f (t)∫ b
κ(P) G(t)dF(t)
where f (t) is the density function of
the original distribution. Thus buyers form their expectations of a certified
product as ∫ b
κ(P) tG(t)dF(t)∫ b
κ(P) G(t)dF(t)
= Ω (κ(P), b) .
First, this observation further emphasizes the idea that buyers are only
able to attribute a value to a certificate for equilibrium outcomes but not for
off-equilibrium incidences. Second, in an equilibrium of the form stated
in Proposition 2.3, the value of a certificate directly depends both on the
population of the seller types who choose to test and on the nature of
the testing technology. This implies that to be able to assess a certificate,
a buyer first needs to understand what types of products are likely to
choose to test and how difficult it is to pass such a test. Third, note that
the value of the certificate Ω (κ(P), b) for a given type distribution and
a given testing technology is a function of the certification fee P. Hence,
when the certification fee changes, the value of the certificate also changes.
Compared to the case in which a perfect testing technology is available, the
dependence on the test takers’ population is crucial in imperfect testing. In
the former case, a certifier can always identify the type when a product is
tested. The meaning of such a test can be made independent of the seller’s
type distribution. In our imperfect testing case, the certifier has to rely
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on a positive measure of seller types to make the certificate meaningful.
This dependence is responsible for the limited ability of the certifier both
in ensuring demand for the test (Remark 2.1) and in taking up market
surplus against the seller (Remark 2.3).
2.5.3 Free certification
There is one subgame yet to be discussed, the one induced by P = 0. It is
of additional importance because we are also interested in the case when
tests are provided for free to the seller, for instance, through a public
policy program.
Proposition 2.4. In the subgame induced by P = 0, buyers make positive bids
for a certified product if and only if Ω(a, b) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Free certification produces two contrasting outcomes with respect to trad-
ing probabilities. It gives the maximum probability of
∫ b
a G(t)dF(t) when
Ω(a, b) > 0 since all seller types have already chosen to test and there is
no other way to increase the probability of having a certified product. If
Ω(a, b) < 0, the product will for sure not be traded. However, neither of
these two is necessarily desirable compared to the socially optimal level
discussed in subsection 2.6.3 below.
2.6 Monopoly: market performance
2.6.1 Equilibrium of the game
After having investigated all subgames, we are now ready to solve the
game in its entirety. At the first stage, the certifier chooses the certification
fee for the test, P ∈ R+. Since we put aside bypassing equilibria, the next
result follows.
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Proposition 2.5. In equilibrium, a monopoly certifier sets P to maximize profit
Π(P) = P[1− F(κ(P))]. That is,
P∗ = arg max
P∈(0,b)
P[1− F(κ(P))]. (2.6)
It can also be represented as to choose the indifferent type x, such that it maximizes
the certifier’s profit. Formally,
x∗ = arg max
x∈(a,b)
G(x)Ω(x, b)[1− F(x)]. (2.7)
Proof. See Appendix.
The monopoly certifier’s trade-off resembles that of many other monopoly
producers who face a downward sloping demand curve. Demand de-
creases when the fee (price) increases. The difference, however, is that
while the negative slope of the demand function of consumer products
is normally a result of consumers’ descending willingness to pay for the
unit-by-unit-identical product, here the value of the certificate that is be-
ing offered is actually evolving along with participating seller types. The
value of a certificate deteriorates in the participation of lower seller types.
When a certifier lowers its certification fee, it lowers the value of its cer-
tificate too.
2.6.2 An example
To have a better understanding of the equilibrium outcome, we present a
fully specified numerical example.
Example 2.1. Suppose seller types are uniformly distributed on the interval
[−2, 1], that is, F(t) = t+23 . The testing technology G(t) follows a power func-
tion, G(t) =
( t+2
3
)2 on [−2, 1]. Under this model specification, as stated in
Equation (2.22), the monopoly certifier solves the following problem,
max
−2<x<1
(
1− x+ 2
3
)(
x+ 2
3
)2 ∫ 1
x t
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt∫ 1
x
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt .
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The solution to this problem is x = 0.3154. This means the fee the certifier charges
is
P = G(x)Ω(x, 1) =
(
0.3154+ 2
3
)2 ∫ 1
0.3154 t
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt∫ 1
0.3154
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt = 0.4092.
It turns out that seller types in [0.3154, 1] choose to test while the rest choose not
to. Buyers bid
β(C ∣ P = 0.4092) = Ω(0.3154, 1) =
∫ 1
0.3154 t
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt∫ 1
0.3154
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt = 0.6870
for a certified product and 0 for a non-certified. The expected profit the certifier
makes is
Π(0.4092) = P(1− F(x))) = 0.4092
∫ 1
0.3154
1
3
dt = 0.0934,
which is less than the amount it would have made,
Π′ =
∫ 1
0
1
3
tdt = 0.1667,
if a perfect testing technology were available.15 This point can indeed be general-
ized.
Remark 2.4. A monopoly certifier with an imperfect testing technology makes a
smaller profit than a monopoly certifier with a perfect testing technology under
otherwise identical circumstances.
The explanation is the following. With perfect testing technology, a certi-
fier is able to take away the entire trading surplus in the market leaving
nothing to the seller. Consequently, the certifier will seek to reach the
highest possible market surplus. In contrast, with imperfect testing tech-
nology, the surplus generated in the product market is shared between
the certifier and the seller.16 From the perspective of the certifier, with
perfect testing technology it achieves first best outcome; while in the case
15The profit under perfect testing technology is found when the certifier only certifies
types above zero and charges E(t ∣ t ≥ 0).
16Note that the set of seller types who strictly prefer paying for the test obtain positive
expected payoffs. See subsection 2.5.1.
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f (t) = 13
G(t) =
(
t+2
3
)2
f c(t) = G(t) f (t)∫ b
x G(t)dF(t)
Figure 2.1: A case of an uniformly distributed type population
( f (t) = 13 ) and a power testing technology (G(t) =
( t+2
3
)2); types
to the right of the dashed line, [0.3154, 1], pay for the test in equi-
librium; the curve in the upper right represents the type density
function of a certified product.
of imperfect testing technology, not only the certifier’s share is less than 1
but also the total level of generated surplus can be well below maximum.
An interesting question concerns the type distribution of a certified prod-
uct in equilibrium. The type distribution of a certified product has the
support of [0.3154, 1]. Its density function is a transformation of part of the
original density function via the testing technology. Denote f c(t) the new
probability density function of a certified product; f c(t) can be written as
the following.
f c(t) =
G(t) f (t)∫ b
x G(t)dF(t)
=
1
3
( t+2
3
)2∫ 1
0.3154
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt = 0.20566(t+ 2)2.
Figure 2.1 gives a graphical representation of the original distribution,
the testing technology and the transformed type distribution of a certified
product.
33
2.6.3 Welfare
An important issue in markets with asymmetric information is market
performance in terms of social welfare. The next result gives the condition
for welfare maximization.
Proposition 2.6. In the separating equilibrium of subgames induced by 0 <
P < b, market surplus is represented by
∫ b
κ(P) tG(t)dF(t). It is maximized when
κ(P∗∗) = 0, i.e., when type 0 is made indifferent between testing and not testing.
Therefore, the welfare maximizing certification fee is P∗∗ = G(0)Ω(0, b).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is the following. For a product to be traded in a separating
equilibrium, it has to obtain a certificate. Note that trading of positive
types increases while trading of negative types decreases social welfare.
So the ideal outcome is that all positive types obtain a certificate while
all negative types are uncertified. But given the nature of the imperfect
testing technology, this is not achievable. Also note that once a give type
decides to test, the probability of getting a certificate is governed by the
testing technology. The second best is then to set the certification fee to
a level such that it is low enough for all positive types to pay for the test
while it is still high enough to discourage negative types from using the
test. Hence, the optimal certification fee should make type 0 the indifferent
type. Note that G(0)Ω(0, b) is strictly positive, we emphasize the result
as a corollary to Proposition 2.6.
Corollary 2.2. The social welfare maximizing certification fee P∗∗ is strictly
positive.
Apparently, free certification under imperfect testing technology is not
an optimal policy. Because of the inability of the testing technology in
blocking negative types from getting a certificate, we need a positive cer-
tification fee to function as a self-selection mechanism.
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We can also see the difference between social welfare and the certifier’s
profit in a comparison of the following two expressions.
Social welfare :
∫ b
κ(P)
tG(t)dF(t)
Certifier’s profit : P[1− F(κ(P))]
= [1− F(κ(P))]G(κ(P))Ω(κ(P), b)
=
⎧⎨⎩
∫ b
κ(P) G(κ(P))dF(t)∫ b
κ(P) G(t)dF(t)
⎫⎬⎭
∫ b
κ(P)
tG(t)dF(t). (2.8)
They differ by the part in the curly brackets in equation (2.8). Note that
G(t ∣ t > κ(P)) > G(κ(P)), the part in the curly brackets is less than 1.
Hence, not all of the total market surplus is taken by the certifier. Part of
it is shared by the seller. But for a certifier equipped with a perfect testing
technology, G(t ∣ t ≥ κ′) could be set to 1 and G(t ∣ t < κ′) to 0. The part
in the curly brackets hence vanishes and the monopoly certifier’s profit
is equal to the entire social surplus. When such a certifier maximizes its
profit it as well maximizes social welfare. This comparison tells us that
the inability of taking up all market surplus leads to a lower level of social
welfare, i.e., inefficiency.
Boom (2001) shows that in a market with a monopolistic rating agency
there can be over or under supply of rating services in equilibrium com-
pared to socially optimal level. In the next proposition we establish the
necessary condition for profit maximizing conduct to be welfare maxi-
mizing. When this condition does not hold, market either oversupplies or
undersupplies certification service depending on model specification.
Proposition 2.7. A necessary condition for the profit maximizing certifier to set
the welfare maximizing certification fee P∗∗ = G(0)Ω(0, b) is,
f (0)
1− F(0) =
g(0)
G(0)
+
G(0) f (0)∫ b
0 G(t) f (t)dt
. (2.9)
Moreover, when P[1− F(κ(P))] is concave for P ∈ (0, b), there is oversupply
(undersupply) of certification service if
f (0)
1− F(0) > (<)
g(0)
G(0)
+
G(0) f (0)∫ b
0 G(t) f (t)dt
. (2.10)
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Proof. See the Appendix.
This necessary condition requires the Hazard rate of the original type
distribution when evaluated at type 0 has to be equal to the sum of a value
related to the testing technology (G(t)) and certified product’s density at
type 0. When condition (2.9) doesn’t hold, socially optimal certification
fee will not be achieved by profit maximizing monopoly certifier.
Further, with additional information of certifier’s profit function concav-
ity, we can identify conditions for over and under supply of certification
service. When
f (0)
1− F(0) <
g(0)
G(0)
+
G(0) f (0)∫ b
0 G(t) f (t)dt
, (2.11)
the first derivative of profit is positive at type 0. Therefore, the certifier
will have an incentive to raise the certification fee from the socially optimal
level P∗∗ = G(0)Ω(0, b) and the indifferent type will be strictly higher
than type 0. Because there are strictly positive types find the certification
fee too high and do not apply the test, there is under utilization of the
certification service. Social welfare could be improved by lowering the
certification fee. Similarly, when the reverse of condition (2.11) holds, the
indifferent type will be strictly lower than 0 and some negative types will
be traded. Hence there will be oversupply of certification service.
2.6.4 Example 2.1 continued
In the above numerical example, the indifferent type is 0.3154. Social
welfare would be higher if types in [0, 0.3154] applied the test. Hence,
the certification fee 0.4092 is too high. By lowering the fee, more seller
types will use the certification service and the product will have a higher
probability to be traded. To be exact, the socially optimal fee is
P∗∗ = G(0)Ω(0, 1) =
(
2
3
)2 ∫ 1
0 t
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt∫ 1
0
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt = 0.2515.
So that types in [0, 1] choose to test while types in [−2, 0] choose not to.
In Table 2.1 we compare social welfare and the product’s trading proba-
bility in example 2.1 under three different scenarios: perfect testing tech-
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Social welfare∫ b
x tG(t)dF(t)
Trading probability∫ b
x G(t)dF(t)
Perfect testing
∫ 1
0
1
3 tdt =
1
6 = 0.1667
∫ 1
0
1
3dt =
1
3 = 0.3333
Imperfect (Social)
∫ 1
0
1
3 t
( t+2
3
)2 dt = 0.1327 ∫ 10 13 ( t+23 )2 dt = 0.2346
Imperfect (Profit)
∫ 1
0.3154
1
3 t
( t+2
3
)2 dt
= 0.1237
∫ 1
0.3154
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt
= 0.1801
Table 2.1: Welfare under (im)perfect testing in example 2.1.
nology, imperfect testing technology used to maximize social welfare and
imperfect testing technology used to maximize the certifier’s profit. Ac-
cording to the original type distribution, the mean of all positive types
is 1/6 which is the entire surplus that can be generated from trading.
Since with perfect testing technology, all positive types get a certificate,
the probability of trading is 1/3. With imperfect testing technology, un-
der welfare maximization all positive types should at least be tested. For
the given imperfect testing technology G(t) =
( t+2
3
)2, the probability that
the product gets a certificate is only
∫ 1
0
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt = 0.2346. The surplus
generated is
∫ 1
0
1
3 t
( t+2
3
)2 dt = 0.1327. When the certifier maximizes profit,
certification fee is higher and less types apply the test. The probability
that the product gets a certificate now is
∫ 1
0.3154
1
3
( t+2
3
)2 dt = 0.1801. The
generated surplus is
∫ 1
0.3154
1
3 t
( t+2
3
)2 dt = 0.1237 which is less than the
optimal level. So the efficiency of the market is reduced both by the im-
perfectness in testing technology and by the certifier’s profit maximizing
conduct.17
Generally, profit maximizing monopoly certifier does not set the certifi-
cation fee to the socially optimal level. But even when the service is run
by the public sector and the certification fee is optimally set such that all
positive types apply the test and all negative types do not, inefficiency
remains because some positive types will fail the test and will not be
traded. However, compared to the market breakdown outcome without
certification service, there at least will be some trading in a separating
equilibrium. The next remark summarizes.
17Note that in perfect testing case, the certifier’s profit is coincident with social welfare.
One may argue the efficiency loss is entirely caused by testing technology imperfectness.
37
Remark 2.5. An imperfect testing technology solves the asymmetric information
problem imperfectly. The market is not as efficient as it is with perfect test-
ing technology but it does improve buyers’ information on product quality in
equilibrium.
2.7 Duopoly
In this section we investigate a market with two certifiers. The main
purpose of this section is to provide a new perspective for the study of
competing certifiers. To this aim, we are interested in market behavior
with given certification fees. The seller now can choose which certifier
to go for a test or not to test at all. We do not consider the possibility
that a seller type applies both tests. Hence, the seller’s decision ρ maps
R2+ × [a, b] to {TS1, TS2,NTS}. TS1 is to test at Certifier 1 and TS2 is
to test at Certifier 2. When a seller type fails a test, the type is pooled
with those who do not test. For buyers, β is now a function from R2+ ×
{C1,C2,NC} to R+, which specifies their bids for a product conditional
on which certificate it has or none at all. Here, C1 stands for a certificate
from Certifier 1 and C2 a certificate from Certifier 2. As a tie-breaking rule,
in the analysis of equilibrium strategies, when a seller type is indifferent
between two options, he makes the same decision as the type slightly
higher than he is.
2.7.1 Segmentation in identical tests
We consider a case in which these two certifiers employ identical testing
technologies. Formally, we have G1(t) = G2(t) = G(t) for all t ∈ [a, b]. This
setup is to say these two certifiers are providing identical tests and they are
identical except that they charge different certification fees. The next result
reveals that the usual intuition of Bertrand competition between certifiers
need not hold. Even with different certification fees, both certifiers can
attract positive measures of seller types in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.8 (Segmentation). Assume two certifiers charge different certifi-
cation fees and, without loss of generality, the certifier who charges the higher fee is
named Certifier 1 and the one charges the lower fee, Certifier 2, 0 < P2 < P1 < b.
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If there exist x1 and x2 such that a < x2 < x1 < b and
P1 − P2 = G(x1)[Ω(x1, b)−Ω(x2, x1)] (2.12)
P2 = G(x2)Ω(x2, x1), (2.13)
then x1 and x2 identify a subgame equilibrium in which types in (x1, b] strictly
prefer testing at Certifier 1, type x1 is indifferent between testing at either of
these two certifiers, types in (x2, x1) strictly prefer testing at Certifier 2, type x2
is indifferent between testing at Certifier 2 and not to test at all, types below x2
strictly prefer not to test, buyers bid Ω(x1, b) for a product with Certificate 1,
Ω(x2, x1) for a product with Certificate 2 and 0 for a non-certified product. That
is,
ρ∗(t ∣ P1, P2) = TS1, ∀t ∈ [x1, b]
ρ∗(t ∣ P1, P2) = TS2, ∀t ∈ [x2, x1)
ρ∗(t ∣ P1, P2) = NTS, ∀t ∈ [a, x2)
β∗(C1 ∣ P1, P2) = µ(C1 ∣ P1, P2) = Ω(x1, b)
β∗(C2 ∣ P1, P2) = µ(C2 ∣ P1, P2) = Ω(x2, x1)
β∗(NC ∣ P1, P2) = 0, µ(NC ∣ P1, P2) < 0.
Proof. See appendix.
When the equilibrium identified in Proposition 2.8 exists, for instance in
our example in subsection 2.7.2, we call such equilibrium segmentation
equilibrium. The existence of segmentation equilibrium suggests that it
is possible for both certifiers to attract positive measures of seller types
while charging different fees. Since the testing technologies are identical,
they are providing supposedly identical certification service. One may
expect that the lower fee certifier takes up entire market demand for the
certification service and competition would drive the certification fee to
marginal cost as in normal Bertrand competition. In the current setup,
this means free certification service.18 Proposition 2.8, however, shows
this line of reasoning need not hold. When segmentation equilibrium
exists, certifiers need not engage in Bertrand competition because lowering
one’s certification fee does not necessarily increase the demand for its
18Proposition 2.4 finds free certification is generally not socially optimal.
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certification service nor its profit. Being a higher fee certifier does not
mean having zero demand either.
This result can be understood in light of the endogeneity of a certificate’s
value. (Subsection 2.5.2) When the certifiers charge different fees, their
certificates have different values in a segmentation equilibrium. Hence,
although they have identical testing processes, their end products (certifi-
cates) are differentiated.
In the monopoly certifier case, a certification service provides a device
that higher types can differentiate themselves from lower types by paying
for the test. With two certifiers providing imperfect certification services,
those really high types choose the higher fee certifier to differentiate them-
selves from moderate types.
Remark 2.6. 1. A higher certification fee can serve as a signal of higher
product quality.
2. Even with identical imperfect testing technology, duopoly certifiers need
not to engage in Bertrand Competition.
2.7.2 An example in duopoly
We work through an example to verify the existence of segmentation equi-
librium.
Example 2.2. Suppose seller types are distributed on the interval [−1, 1] follow-
ing a power function F(t) =
( t+1
2
) 1
2 . The testing technology G(t) is represented
by this power distribution function as well, G(t) = F(t) =
( t+1
2
) 1
2 on [−1, 1].
The type expectation function Ω(m, n) is, after simple algebra, simply m+n2 .
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) then read
P1 − P2 =
(
x1 + 1
2
) 1
2 1− x2
2
and
P2 =
(
x2 + 1
2
) 1
2 x1 + x2
2
.
Suppose Certifier 1 charges P1 = 0.6 and Certifier 2 charges P2 = 0.1. In this
case, the above system obtains a unique solution, x1 = 0.4742, x2 = −0.1648.
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Seller types in [0.4742, 1] choose Certifier 1, types in [−0.1648, 0.4742) choose
Certifier 2, types in [−1,−0.1648) choose not to test. Type 0.4742 is indeed
indifferent between choosing either of these two certifiers and type −0.1648 is
indifferent between choosing Certifier 2 or not to test at all. Buyers in this case
bid Ω(0.4742, 1) = (0.4742+ 1)/2 = 0.7371 for a product with Certificate 1,
bid Ω(−0.1648, 0.4742) = (−0.1648+ 0.4742)/2 = 0.1547 for a product with
Certificate 2 and bid zero for a non-certified product.
The profits the certifiers make are
Π1(P1 = 0.6, P2 = 0.1) = P1 (1− F(x1)) = 0.084873
and
Π2(P2 = 0.1, P1 = 0.6) = P2 (F(x1)− F(x2)) = 0.021233.
So in this example the higher fee certifier earns a higher profit than the lower fee
certifier.
In the perfect testing case studied in Lizzeri (1999), competition of cer-
tifiers will drive the certification fee to zero. When testing technology
is imperfect, even if both certifiers provide identical testing technology,
the current analysis shows fee differentiation is possible and Bertrand
Competition is not guaranteed. The point is that when certifiers charge
different fees, there can be subgame equilibria in which high seller types
choose the high fee certifier to signal their type. Hence certifiers need
not to lower their certification fee to the marginal cost level. In example
2.2, each certifier has a positive profit and lowering one’s certification fee
doesn’t necessarily increase one’s demand nor profit.
Remark 2.7. Although imperfect testing technology limits certifiers’ power in
collecting generated surplus from the seller, it does help to soften competition
among certifiers.
2.7.3 An alternative explanation to auditing fee differences
The significant fee differentiation between major and non-major auditing
firms has long been documented in the accounting literature (e.g., Simu-
nic (1980)). See also more recent evidence like Hay, Knechel, and Wong
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(2006).19 It is also known that in Initial Public Offerings and debt financ-
ing, firms audited by major auditors generally receive more favorable bids
than those audited by other auditors. Evidences include Teoh and Wong
(1993) and Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2004) among others. The empir-
ical observation here is, in other words, the positive correlation between
auditing fees and bids received.
DeAngelo (1981), Titman and Trueman (1986) and in a context similar
to our work, Hvide (2005), suggest that the differences in auditors’ au-
diting qualities or standards are responsible for this observation.20 Yet,
as acknowledged in Hay, Knechel, and Wong (2006), differences in au-
diting qualities are hard to identify. Here we suggest a new perspective
to this question, namely identical imperfect testing technology. We show
in Example 2.2 that even two identical testing technologies can support
fee differentiation in equilibrium and those who choose the higher fee
certifier receive higher bids from the buyers. Applied to the auditing
context, those major auditing firms (Certifier 1 in Proposition 2.8) may
have exactly the same ability in identifying audited companies’ financial
soundness as other auditing firms (Certifier 2 in Proposition 2.8). If seg-
mentation equilibrium is supported, by paying a higher audition fee, a
company of higher quality receives higher bids in equilibrium. Audited
by a non-major auditing firm, however, signals a lower quality. Note also
that moderate quality companies will not try major auditing firms since
those are too expensive and they are very likely to get unfavorable au-
diting reports. They try non-major firms nevertheless since the fee is low
enough to justify their relatively small probability of getting favorable au-
diting reports. To apply the above analysis, we only need to assume that
auditing processes are imperfect, that is, auditing firms are not able to
know exactly the financial situation of each audited firm and yet are able
to ensure better companies have a higher probability receiving favorable
financial reports.
That major auditing firms make more profits than the rest is also predicted
in Example 2.2. Though we have argued that different certification fees
19Major auditing firms here refer to the few largest auditing firms. The exact number
varies from time to time.
20Additional references on this topic can be found in Hvide (2005).
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P1, P2 are possible in equilibrium, we leave solving the entire duopoly
game to future research.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a general model of imperfect testing tech-
nology in certification services. The main assumption of our suggested
model is that whenever two products get tested the higher quality product
is more likely to pass than the lower quality one. The model also admits
continuous quality types and strategic certifiers.
The analysis provided in this chapter aims to improve our understanding
of imperfect certification. It’s not always clear what a certificate means
in real life. Yet, we have seen a large number of successful certification
services that are of practical uses. This chapter takes a formal theoretical
approach and proves that when a certification service can ensure that
higher quality products stand a better chance obtaining a certificate than
lower quality products, such certification service can reduce information
asymmetry and facilitate trading.
Monopoly certifiers with imperfect testing technologies are not as pow-
erful as they would be if perfect testing technologies were available. Ac-
cording to the analysis, a certifier with an imperfect technology can be
completely bypassed. This is in sharp contrast to the case of perfect test-
ing technology.
A separating equilibrium is also supported in which only high quality
seller types (products) utilize the certification service. By paying the cer-
tification fee a seller type in principle obtains the right to play a lottery.
The lottery, however, is type dependent and is in favor of higher types
since higher types are more likely to get a certificate for the same certi-
fication fee. The value of a certificate is determined jointly by the type
distribution and the nature of the testing technology. Welfare accounting
shows that the monopolistic certifier’s profit maximizing conduct can lead
to under or over supply of certification service depending on model spec-
ification. The welfare maximizing certification fee is always positive and
such that it makes all positive types choose to test. Hence, free certification
is not recommended under imperfect testing technology.
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When there are two certifiers with identical testing technologies offering
certification services in the market, intuition suggests Bertrand competi-
tion of the certifiers. While this is true in the perfect testing case studied
in Lizzeri (1999), the arguments for Bertrand competition are not valid in
imperfect testing cases. Segmentation equilibrium in which higher seller
types choose the more expensive certification service and not so high types
choose the less expensive service can be supported. In this case, keeping
on lowering one’s certification fee is not necessarily the best response. In
the context of auditing industry, we show that to explain the fee differ-
entiation between major and non-major auditing firms we do not have to
assume differences in auditing processes.
2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. If no seller types choose to get the product tested, the type popu-
lation of a non-certified product is exactly the original one. Hence, it is
optimal for the buyers to bid max{E(t), 0} for a non-certified product. As
long as the buyers believe the type of a certified product µ(t ∣ C, P) ≤ E(t),
that is, it is not above the population mean, any bid
β(P,C) = max{µ(t ∣ C, P), 0}
for a certified product is one of the best responses (Condition 2.2).
Because a certificate is an off-equilibrium incidence and any type except
type a could get a certificate with a strictly positive probability, buyers’
beliefs for a certified product can be supported (Condition 2.3).21,22
If buyers’ bids for a certified product are no higher than those for a non-
certified product, no seller types choose to test. Note also that a single
21Given that there is a positive probability for low types to pass, buyers’ belief are not
irrational. For perfect Bayesian equilibrium, any not exactly impossible off-equilibrium
belief will do. In other words, there is no prior to be updated.
22Here buyers can hold different beliefs so long as they satisfy the specified conditions,
i.e., their beliefs for a non-certified product are both no higher than the ex ante type
expectation.
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type choosing to test does not convince the buyers to bid higher, so the
seller will not pay for the test after learning his own type (Condition 2.4).
Given the strategies of the seller and the buyers, the certifier’s action is
irrelevant (Condition 2.5).
2.9.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. With respect to the certification fee P, we have the following two
cases.
P > b: It is obvious that in no cases buyers will bid above b. All seller
types will make a loss by paying for the test. Since E(t) ≤ 0, buyers
bid zero for a non-certified and up to their belief for a certified
product. So any of the stated strategy pair constitutes an equilibrium
in these subgames. Note that buyers’s out of equilibrium belief a <
µ(t ∣ C, P > b) ≤ b can be supported.
P = b: Note that any combination of seller types other than type b alone
choosing to test will result buyers’ belief for a certified product being
less than b, µ(t ∣ C) < b. In turn their bids β(C ∣ P) < b. Choosing
to test makes a loss for all seller types in such a situation.
When type b alone chooses to test, however, we have µ(t ∣ C) = b.
Because type b for sure gets the certificate by choosing to test, type
b is indifferent between testing
β(C ∣ P)− P = b− b = 0,
and not testing (also 0). Types other than b has a strictly positive
possibility of getting no certificate. Consequently, if choose to test,
seller types t < b will receive a negative payoff G(t)b− b < 0. The
only equilibrium other than bypassing when P = b is then the one in
which type b alone chooses to test and all others not to. The buyers
then bid b for a certified product and 0 for a non-certified product
in this equilibrium. Since type b alone is of zero measure, buyers’
belief for a non-certified product remains to be the product’s prior
expectation E(t) which is less than zero.
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2.9.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. The logic of the proof is the following. First, we investigate the
properties of equilibrium strategies in subgames induced by P ∈ (0, b)
with some seller types choosing to test, when such equilibrium exists.
Second, we prove the existence by constructing strategies that fulfill all
such properties. The uniqueness of the equilibrium is then shown by
examination of an equivalent mathematical system.
Step 1 is to show that in such equilibria buyers bid more for a certified
product and the lowest seller type does not choose to test in equilibrium.
In the subgames induced by 0 < P < b, suppose there exist a set of
seller types who choose to test by paying the testing fee P in equilibrium.
Denote such a set Ψ(P). That is,
Ψ(P) ≡ {t ∣ ρ∗(t ∣ P) = TS}.
For all seller types in Ψ(P), the expected payoff from testing has to be no
less than what they could get by not to test. We have, ∀t ∈ Ψ(P),
G(t)β(C ∣ P) + (1− G(t))β(NC ∣ P)− P ≥ β(NC ∣ P). (2.14)
After rearranging, ∀t ∈ Ψ(P),
G(t)[β(C ∣ P)− β(NC ∣ P)] ≥ P. (2.15)
Since P > 0 by assumption, ∀t ∈ Ψ(P)
G(t)[β(C ∣ P)− β(NC ∣ P)] > 0.
Note that ∀t ∈ [a, b],G(t) ≥ 0, so both G(t ∣ t ∈ Ψ(P)) and β(C ∣ P) −
β(NC ∣ P) have to be strictly larger than zero. That is,
a /∈ Ψ(P) ∧ β(C ∣ P) > β(NC ∣ P). (2.16)
So we showed that when there exist a set of seller types who choose to
test by paying a strictly positive fee in equilibrium, buyers bid more for a
certified product and the lowest seller type a does not test.
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Step 2 is to prove when buyers bid more for a certified product the set of
seller types that pay for the test exists and is of the form [x, b].
Let’s denote Γ(t) the difference in expected payoffs for type t between to
test and not to.
Γ(t) ≡ G(t)[β(C ∣ P)− β(NC ∣ P)]− P. (2.17)
Apparently, t ∈ Ψ(P) if and only if Γ(t) ≥ 0. Note that for any given P
and β such that 0 < P < b and β(C ∣ P) > β(NC ∣ P), Γ(t) is continuous
and strictly increasing in t; Γ(b) ≥ Γ(t) ∀t ∈ [a, b]. Hence, if any types
choose to test, type b must be one of them, b ∈ Ψ(P).
1. Suppose type b is the only element of Ψ(P), that is Ψ = {b}. From
Proposition 2.2, β(C ∣ P) = b and β(NC ∣ P) = 0. Therefore, com-
bined with G(b) = 1 and P < b, we have Γ(b) = G(b)b− P > 0.
Solving the equation G(t)b− P = 0, we have t = G−1(P/b) where
G−1 is the inverse of G. Because G(t) is strictly increasing, for the
types t ∈ (G−1(P/b), b), their expected payoff of testing G(t)b− P is
strictly larger than zero. These types will also choose to test. Hence
we prove that when 0 < P < b, the supposition that Ψ(P) has only
one element is false.
2. Now we know Ψ(P), when it exists, contains more elements than
just type b alone. Note also G(t) is strictly increasing and β(C ∣
P) > β(NC ∣ P). Therefore, if a type t′ other than b is in Ψ(P),
that is, if the expression (2.15) holds for t′, it also must hold with
strict inequality for any t > t′. Hence, all t such that t > t′ should
be in Ψ(P) as well. Moreover, these types strictly prefer testing. In
equilibrium, the set of seller types strictly prefer testing must be of
the form (x, b] or [x, b] for some x < b.
3. For type b, we have
Γ(b) = G(b)[β(C ∣ P)− β(NC ∣ P)]− P > 0.
This inequality holds strictly because type b obtains a higher payoff
than type infΨ(P). For type a, G(a) = 0,
Γ(a) = −P < 0.
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By the continuity and monotonicity of function Γ(t), there is a unique
solution for Γ(t) = 0 in the domain of (a, b). Suppose x = Γ−1(0),
for type x, it is indifferent between to test and not to test. For t > x,
Γ(t) > 0. Consequently, when buyers bid more for a certified prod-
uct the set of seller types that pay for the test exists in each subgame
induced by 0 < P < b and, by the tie-breaking rule, is of the form
[x, b].
Step 3 is to construct the required buyers’ optimal bids.
In this part we search out compatible buyers’ strategies, β(⋅ ∣ P) that will
satisfy
β(C ∣ P) > β(NC ∣ P) ≥ 0.
Buyers bid positively for a certified product (β(C ∣ P) > 0), only when
their beliefs for a certified product is positive (µ(t ∣ C) > 0). In equilib-
rium, µ(t ∣ C) requires to be consistent with rational expectation,
µ(t ∣ C) = E(t ∣ C).
Further, by the following identity
Pr(C)E(t ∣ C) + (1− Pr(C))E(t ∣ NC) ≡ E(t) < 0, (2.18)
it cannot be true that both conditional expectations are non-negative.
Hence, to have E(t ∣ C) > 0, E(t ∣ NC) has to be less than zero. In
turn, µ(t ∣ NC) < 0 and β(NC ∣ P) = 0. Since the set of seller types that
choose to test is of the form [x, b], the buyers’ Bayesian updated belief
should be,
E(t ∣ C) =
∫ b
x tG(t)dF(t)∫ b
x G(t)dF(t)
= Ω(x, b). (2.19)
The bid for a certified product is, therefore, β(C ∣ P) = E(t ∣ C) = Ω(x, b).
To find indifferent type x, we need to solve
G(x)[Ω(x, b)− 0] = P.
The existence and uniqueness of the solution is established in the next
step. Note that if G(x)Ω(x, b) = P holds, then Ω(x, b) = PG(x) . Since
both P and G(t), ∀t ∈ (a, b] are larger than zero, Ω(x, b) is also large than
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zero. Hence we constructed feasible buyers’ strategies and their beliefs.
For 0 < P < b, buyers bid
β(C ∣ P) = µ(t ∣ C) = E(t ∣ C) = Ω(x, b)
and β(NC ∣ P) = 0 with belief µ(t ∣ NC) < 0. These bidding strategies
are compatible to the seller’s strategy.
Step 4 is to prove the existence and uniqueness of the indifferent type x
for each 0 < P < b.
The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the subgames boils
down to the existence and uniqueness of the solution to Γ(t) = 0 or
G(x)Ω(x, b) = P. (2.20)
Note that Ω(x, b) is bounded, it is clear that
lim
x→aG(x)Ω(x, b) = 0 and
lim
x→b
G(x)Ω(x, b) = b.
Note also functionΩ(x, b) and G(x)Ω(x, b) are continuous,23 G(x)Ω(x, b) =
P obtains at least one solution when 0 < P < b.
To prove the uniqueness, we first derive the derivative of the function
Ω(x, b),
dΩ(x, b)
dx
=
G(x) f (x)
∫ b
x (t− x)G(t)dF(t)(∫ b
x G(t)dF(t)
)2 .
It’s easy to verify that all parts in the right hand side are positive. Hence
dΩ(x,b)
dx > 0 and Ω(x, b) increases in x.
According to the value of Ω(a, b), we discuss two cases.
1. When Ω(a, b) ≥ 0, then Ω(x, b) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ (a, b]. Since the derivative
of the function G(x)Ω(x, b) is as the following:
d (G(x)Ω(x, b))
dx
= g(x)Ω(x, b) + G(x)
dΩ(x, b)
dx
. (2.21)
23The continuity of Ω(x, b) follows from the theorem that the quotient of two contin-
uous functions is continuous. That the divisor
∫ b
x G(t)dF(t) is non-zero for x ∈ (a, b) is
checked.
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All parts are positive and G(x)Ω(x, b) increases monotonically form
0 to b. Hence Equation 2.20 only obtains one solution when 0 < P <
b.
2. WhenΩ(a, b) < 0, because of continuity and monotonicity ofΩ(x, b),
we first find x such that Ω(x, b) = 0. For any x < x, Ω(x, b) < 0
hence Equation (2.20) has no solution. Within the interval of [x, b],
G(x)Ω(x, b) increases monotonically form 0 to b. Hence Equation
(2.20) only obtains one solution in [x, b] when 0 < P < b.
This proves the existence and uniqueness of the indifferent type x for
each 0 < P < b. Together with above steps, all conditions required by
equilibrium notion (Definition 2.1) for the subgames are satisfied and we
have established uniqueness.
2.9.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. 1. If Ω(a, b) > 0, it’s easy to verify that all types choose to test
and buyers bid Ω(a, b) for a certified product and zero for a non-
certified product is an equilibrium.
2. On the other hand, if buyers make positive bids for a certified prod-
uct, all types above a will choose to test. This is because there is
simply no cost involved in testing for the seller and there is a certain
probability receiving positive bids. Hence, to test is the dominant
strategy except for the lowest type. Suppose Ω(a, b) ≤ 0, then buy-
ers’ belief for a certified product is non-positive and consequently
will bid zero for a certified product. This contradicts the supposition
that buyers make positive bids. Hence when buyers make positive
bids, Ω(a, b) > 0.
2.9.5 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. According to Corollary 2.1, if P ≥ b or P = 0 the seller’s profit will
be zero. Note as well that according to the proof of the uniqueness of the
subgame equilibrium when 0 < P < b, G(t)Ω(t, b) is a continuous and
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strictly increasing function in (a, b) or (x, b) where x is find by solving
Ω(x, b) = 0 when Ω(a, b) < 0.24 Hence, its inverse function κ(P) from
(0, b) to (a, b) or (x, b) is also strictly increasing in (0, b). Consequently, the
certifier can also maximize his profit by optimally choosing the indifferent
type x. The certification fee P is then G(x)Ω(x, b). From Proposition 2.3,
the demand for certification service will be 1− F(x). The product of these
two components give the profit,25
Π(x) = (1− F(x))G(x)Ω(x, b), x ∈ (a, b). (2.22)
Since the extreme points in Corollary 2.1 are dominated, the maximum is
obtained inside the interval. The certifier’s best response to the equilibrium
strategies of the seller and the buyers is hence P∗ defined in Equation (2.6).
This, together with Proposition 2.3, concludes the proof.
2.9.6 Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. Because buyer always bid up to the expected value of a certified
product, they do not derive positive gains. Social welfare is then the sum
of the payoff of the certifier and the payoff of the seller. Moreover, the
sum is exactly what buyers pay for the product in equilibrium, because
this is the only source for the revenues of both the certifier and the seller.
Since buyers bid zero for a non-certified product, trading only takes place
when the product has a certificate. The total surplus is then, for a given
certification fee, the result of multiplying buyers’ bid for a certified product
and the probability of the product getting a certificate,
Ω(κ(P), b)
∫ b
κ(P)
G(t)dF(t) =
∫ b
κ(P)
tG(t)dF(t).
Taking derivative of this expression gives us,
d
(∫ b
κ(P) tG(t)dF(t)
)
d (κ(P))
= −κ(P)G(κ(P)) f (κ(P)). (2.23)
24See 2.9.3, especially Step 4 and Equation (2.21).
25Note that when Ω(x, b) < 0 when x ∈ (a, x), Π(x) < 0 on this interval too. This
allows us to represent the problem as Equation (2.22) without explicitly write the case for
(x, b).
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It is then obvious that the right hand side of equation (2.23) is strictly
negative when κ(P) > 0, strictly positive when κ(P) < 0 and equal to
zero when κ(P) = 0. Maximization of
∫ b
κ(P) tG(t)dF(t) with a < κ(P) < b
requires κ(P) = 0. The welfare maximizing certification fee is hence P∗∗ =
G(0)Ω(0, b).
2.9.7 Proof of Proposition 2.7
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 2.5 we show that the certifier can set
the indifferent type x to maximize profit. The first order derivative of
Π(x) = G(x)Ω(x, b)[1− F(x)] is
g(x)Ω(x, b)[1− F(x)] + G(x)[1− F(x)]dΩ(x, b)
dx
− G(x)Ω(x, b) f (x)
=g(x)Ω(x, b)
(
[1− F(x)]
(
1+
G(x)
g(x)Ω(x, b)
dΩ(x, b)
dx
)
− G(x)
g(x)
f (x)
)
.
(2.24)
Since g(x) > 0 and Ω(x, b) > 0, when 0 < P < 0 a necessary condition
for profit maximization is
[1− F(x)]
(
1+
G(x)
g(x)Ω(x, b)
dΩ(x, b)
dx
)
− G(x)
g(x)
f (x) = 0
⇒ [1− F(x)]
(
1+
G(x)
g(x)Ω(x, b)
dΩ(x, b)
dx
)
=
G(x)
g(x)
f (x)
⇒ f (x)
1− F(x) =
g(x)
G(x)
+
dΩ(x, b)
dx
1
Ω(x, b)
. (2.25)
Hence if profit maximizing x is socially optimal, i.e., x∗ = 0, the next
condition has to hold,
f (0)
1− F(0) =
g(0)
G(0)
+
1
Ω(0, b)
dΩ(x, b)
dx
∣∣∣
x=0
.
Note that
dΩ(x, b)
dx
=
d
dx
(∫ b
x tG(t) f (t)dt∫ b
x G(t) f (t)dt
)
=
G(x) f (x)
∫ b
x tG(t) f (t)dt− xG(x) f (x)
∫ b
x G(t) f (t)dt(∫ b
x G(t) f (t)dt
)2
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hence
dΩ(x, b)
dx
∣∣∣
x=0
=
G(0) f (0)
∫ b
0 tG(t) f (t)dt(∫ b
0 G(t) f (t)dt
)2 .
Consequently,
f (0)
1− F(0) =
g(0)
G(0)
+
1
Ω(0, b)
dΩ(x, b)
dx
∣∣∣
x=0
=
g(0)
G(0)
+
( ∫ b
0 G(t) f (t)dt∫ b
0 tG(t) f (t)dt
)
G(0) f (0)
∫ b
0 tG(t) f (t)dt(∫ b
0 G(t) f (t)dt
)2
=
g(0)
G(0)
+
G(0) f (0)∫ b
0 G(t) f (t)dt
.
This proves the first part of Proposition 2.7. With the additional condition
of profit function concavity, we know the second derivative is negative and
the first order condition (2.25) becomes sufficient for profit maximization.
However, we are interested in the value of the first derivative (2.24) at
x = 0. When it is larger than 0, the monopoly certifier will increase P
in order to increase x and because of the profit function concavity the
profit maximizing x∗ is larger than 0. Consequently, some positive types
find it too expensive to test and the certification service is under supplied.
Hence, the condition for undersupply is
g(x)Ω(x, b)
(
[1− F(x)]
(
1+
G(x)
g(x)Ω(x, b)
dΩ(x, b)
dx
)
− G(x)
g(x)
f (x)
) ∣∣∣
x=0
> 0
⇒
(
[1− F(x)]
(
1+
G(x)
g(x)Ω(x, b)
dΩ(x, b)
dx
)
− G(x)
g(x)
f (x)
) ∣∣∣
x=0
> 0
⇒ g(0)
G(0)
+
G(0) f (0)∫ b
0 G(t) f (t)dt
>
f (0)
1− F(0) .
Likewise, when
f (0)
1− F(0) >
g(0)
G(0)
+
G(0) f (0)∫ b
0 G(t) f (t)dt
there is oversupply of certification service. So we proved the second part
of Proposition 2.7.
53
2.9.8 Proof of Proposition 2.8
Proof. The following is to prove when a < x2 < x1 < b solve the system
of equations (2.12) and (2.13), we claim the strategies profile in Proposi-
tion 2.8 constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This is done in the
following steps.
1. First, for given 0 < P2 < P1 < b when a < x2 < x1 < b solves
P1 − P2 = G(x1)[ Ω(x1, b)−Ω(x2, x1)]
P2 = G(x2)Ω(x2, x1),
we have Ω(x1, b) > Ω(x2, x1) > 0. This is because G(t) > 0, ∀t > a.
2. Suppose types in [x1, b] choose Certifier 1, types in [x2, x1) choose
Certifier 2 and types in [a, x2) chooses not to test, then buyers ex-
pectation for a product certified by Certifier 1 µ(C1 ∣ P1, P2) =
E(C1 ∣ P1, P2) is Ω(x1, b) and for a product certified by Certifier
2 µ(C2 ∣ P1, P2) = E(C2 ∣ P1, P2) is Ω(x2, x1). Because the prior
expectation of the product is negative, the expectation for a none
certified product µ(NC ∣ P1, P2) is less than zero.
3. Then buyers bids are β(C1 ∣ P1, P2) = Ω(x1, b) for a product certified
by Certifier 1, β(C2 ∣ P1, P2) = Ω(x2, x1) for a product certified by
Certifier 2 and 0 for a non-certified product.
4. Since P1 − P2 = G(x1)[ Ω(x1, b)−Ω(x2, x1)] , P2 = G(x2)Ω(x2, x1)
and G(t) strictly increases in t, we have for all x1 < t ≤ b,
G(t)[ Ω(x1, b)−Ω(x2, x1)] > P1 − P2
G(t)Ω(x2, x1) > P2
=⇒ G(t) Ω(x1, b)− P1 > G(t) Ω(x2, x1)− P2 > 0;
for all x2 < t < x1,
G(t)[ Ω(x1, b)−Ω(x2, x1)] < P1 − P2
G(t)Ω(x2, x1) > P2
=⇒ G(t) Ω(x2, x1)− P2 > G(t) Ω(x1, b)− P1
G(t) Ω(x2, x1)− P2 > 0;
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for all a ≤ t < x2,
G(t)[ Ω(x1, b)−Ω(x2, x1)] < P1 − P2
G(t)Ω(x2, x1) < P2
=⇒ 0 > G(t) Ω(x2, x1) > P2.G(t) Ω(x1, b)− P1.
Hence we compared the expected payoffs for different choices for
types in [a, b]. Employing also the tie break rule, we conclude that it
is true that types in [x1, b] choose Certifier 1, types in [x2, x1) choose
Certifier 2 and types in [a, x2) choose not to test.
5. In summary, if there exist such x1, x2 that satisfy a < x2 < x1 <
b and solve the system of equations (2.12) and (2.13), the above
construction proves that the strategy combinations in Proposition
2.8 constitute an equilibrium for the given P1, P2.
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Chapter 3
A Note on the Excess Entry
Theorem in Spatial Models
with Elastic Demand1
3.1 Introduction
Three main frameworks have been widely used to study product differ-
entiation and monopolistic competition: representative consumer, discrete
choice and spatial models. In representative consumer and discrete choice
models, it is understood that equilibrium product variety could either be
excessive or insufficient or optimal depending on the model configura-
tion.2 In spatial models such as Vickrey (1964) and Salop (1979), however,
analysis shows that there is always excessive entry. This result became
known as the excess entry theorem. Matsumura and Okamura (2006)
extend this result for a large set of transportation costs and production
technologies.3
One drawback of standard spatial models such as Hotelling (1929) and
Salop (1979) is that consumer demand is completely inelastic. Each con-
1This chapter is coauthored with Tobias Wenzel and has been published in the Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization.
2See, for example, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Pettengill (1979), Lancaster (1975), Sattinger
(1984), Hart (1985) among many others.
3They do point out that there are also some situations in which entry can be insuffi-
cient.
56
sumer demands a single unit of a differentiated product.4 In this chapter
we lift this restrictive assumption in the context of the Salop model and
investigates the implications of price-dependent demand for the excess
entry theorem.
To this aim, we incorporate a demand function with a constant elastic-
ity into the Salop framework. We find that the number of entrants in a
free-entry equilibrium is the lower the more elastic demand is. We also
find that only when demand is sufficiently inelastic, there is excess entry.
Otherwise, entry is insufficient. In the limiting case when the demand
elasticity approaches unity, the market becomes a monopoly. Thus, the
excess entry theorem is only valid for sufficiently inelastic demand and
hence, the assumption of inelastic demand, typically employed, is not an
innocuous one. This result is independent of whether we use a first-best
or a second-best welfare benchmark. As a consequence of our welfare
analysis we point out when and how a public policy can be desirable. In
an extension, we broaden our result with a more general transportation
cost function.
Our model setup is closely related to Anderson and de Palma (2000).
The purpose of their paper is to develop a model that integrates fea-
tures of spatial models where competition is localized and representative
consumer models where competition between firms is global. The formu-
lation of the individual demand function is the same as in Anderson and
de Palma (2000).5 They also consider a constant elasticity demand func-
tion. However, the difference lies in the perspectives of the works. Their
focus is on the interaction between local and global competition, while
the present work focuses on the implications of price-dependent demand
on the excess entry result in spatial models.
Other approaches to introduce price-dependent demand into spatial mod-
els are Boeckem (1994), Rath and Zhao (2001) and Peitz (2002).6 The first
4The assumption of inelastic demand can be a realistic one in the case of some durable
goods, e.g. houses, etc. However, in case of nondurables, e.g. groceries, etc, the assump-
tion seems less plausible.
5Our model is the special case of Anderson and de Palma (2000) when eliminating
the taste component in their utility function. Thus, in this chapter we consider a pure
spatial model, while Anderson and de Palma (2000) analyze a model that has features of
spatial and representative consumer models.
6A recent paper by Peng and Tabuchi (2007) combines a model of spatial competition
with taste for variety in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In their setup, the quantity
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two papers consider variants of the Hotelling framework. Boeckem (1994)
introduces heterogenous consumers with respect to reservation prices.
Depending on the price charged by firms some consumers choose not
to buy a product. The paper by Rath and Zhao (2001) introduces elastic
demand in the Hotelling framework by assuming that the quantity de-
manded by each consumer depends on the price charged. The authors
propose a utility function that is quadratic in the quantity of the differen-
tiated product leading to a linear demand function. In contrast to those
two models we build on the Salop model as we are interested in the
relationship between price-dependent demand and entry into the mar-
ket. Our approach is closer to Rath and Zhao (2001) as we also assume
that each consumer has a downward sloping demand for the differenti-
ated good. However, our demand function takes on a different functional
form which has the advantage of yielding tractable results. Peitz (2002)
features unit-elastic demand both in Hotelling and Salop settings but fo-
cuses on conditions for existence of Nash equilibrium in prices. He does
not consider entry decisions.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the model. Section
3.3 presents the analysis of the model. Section 3.4 analyzes the welfare
outcome and policy implications. An extension with more general trans-
portation cost functions is provided in section 3.5. Section 3.6 summarizes.
3.2 The model
There is a unit mass of consumers who are located on a circle with cir-
cumference one. The location of a consumers is denoted by x. In contrast
to Salop (1979), consumers are not limited to buy a single unit of the dif-
ferentiated good. The amount they purchase depends on the price. We
propose the following utility function which leads to a demand function
with a constant elasticity of e. We assume that this utility function is
identical for all consumers:
demanded also depends on the price. However, their focus is a different one. They study
the incentives of how much variety to offer and how many stores to establish. A paper by
Hamilton, Klein, Sheshinski, and Slutsky (1994) analyzes elastic demand in a model with
quantity competition. In contrast to the present note the authors employ a transportation
costs per unit of quantity purchased.
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U =
⎧⎨⎩
(
V − e1−eq
e−1
e
d − t ∗ dist
)
+ qh if consumes the differentiated product
qh otherwise.
(3.1)
The utility derived by the consumption of the differentiated good consists
of three parts. There is a gross utility for consuming this good (V). The
second utility component depends on the quantity consumed (qd). The
parameter e —which lies between (0,1)—will later turn out to be the de-
mand elasticity. Finally, consumers have to incur transportation costs if
the product’s attributes do not match consumers’ locations. We assume
that transportation costs do not depend on the quantity consumed. Fur-
thermore, we assume that transportation costs are linear in distance.7 In
section 3.5, we will lift this assumption and cover a broader class of trans-
portation cost functions, namely power transportation costs. The variable
qh denotes the quantity of a homogenous good which serves as a nu-
meraire good. The utility is linear in this commodity. Additionally, we
make the assumption that the gross utility of the differentiated good (V)
is large enough such that no consumers abstains from buying the differ-
entiated product.8
Each consumer has an exogenous income of Y which he can divide be-
tween the consumption of the differentiated good and the numeraire good.
The price of the differentiated good is pd, while the price of the numeraire
is normalized to one. This leads to the following budget constraint:
Y = pd ∗ qd + qh. (3.2)
Consumers maximize their utility (3.1) under their budget constraint (3.2).
Then, demand for the differentiated product and the numeraire is:
qˆd = p−ed , (3.3)
7This allows a direct comparison to Salop (1979) model because the transportation
cost is linear in that paper as well.
8This helps us to avoid situations in which a firm could be a local monopoly, hence
the kink in the firm’s demand curve.
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qˆh = Y− p1−ed . (3.4)
The demand for the differentiated good exhibits a constant demand elas-
ticity of e. A higher value of e corresponds to more elastic demand. The
limit case of e→ 0 corresponds to completely inelastic demand. Inserting
these demand functions into equation (3.1) gives the indirect utility a con-
sumer derives from consuming the differentiated product from a certain
firm:
Uˆ = V +Y− 1
1− e p
1−e
d − t ∗ dist. (3.5)
There are n firms that offer the differentiated product. We assume that
these firms are located equidistantly on the circle. Hence, the distance
between two neighboring firms is 1n . Consumers choose to buy the dif-
ferentiated product from the firm which offers them the highest utility.
Given the symmetric structure of the model, we seek for a symmetric
equilibrium. Therefore we derive demand of a representative firm i. The
marginal consumer is the consumer who is indifferent between choosing
firm i and an adjacent firm. When firm i charges a price pi while the re-
maining firms charge a price p, the marginal consumer is implicitly given
by
V +Y− 1
1− e p
1−e
i − tx¯ = V +Y−
1
1− e p
1−e − t
(
1
n
− x¯
)
, (3.6)
or explicitly by
x¯ =
1
2n
+
p1−e − p1−ei
2(1− e)t . (3.7)
As each firm faces two adjacent firms, the number of consumers choosing
to buy from firm i is 2x¯. According to equation (3.3), each consumer buys
an amount of qˆi = p−ei . Hence total demand at firm i is:
Di = 2x¯ ∗ p−ei . (3.8)
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In contrast to the Salop model, total demand consists now of two parts:
market share and quantity per consumer.
3.3 Analysis
This section analyzes the equilibrium. We start by deriving equilibrium
prices for a given number of firms in the market. In a second step, we
seek to determine the number of firms that enter.
3.3.1 Price equilibrium
We look for a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms charge the same
price. Assuming zero production costs, the profit of a representative firm
i when this firm charges a price pi and all remaining firms charge a price
p is given by:
Πi =
[
1
n
+
p1−e − p1−ei
(1− e)t
]
p−ei pi. (3.9)
Maximizing profits with respect to the price pi and assuming symmetry
among all firms leads to the following equilibrium price:9
p∗ =
[
(1− e) t
n
] 1
1−e
. (3.10)
The corresponding quantity purchased by each consumer then is
q∗ =
[
(1− e) t
n
]− e1−e
. (3.11)
As in the Salop model, the equilibrium price increases in transportation
costs and decreases in the number of firms in the market. Conversely, the
quantity purchased by each consumer rises with the number of firms and
decreases with transportation costs. More interesting is the impact of the
9For the proof of the existence of a symmetric price equilibrium, the reader is referred
to Anderson and de Palma (2000).
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demand elasticity on the equilibrium price and quantity. Differentiation
with respect to e yields:
∂p∗
∂e
⋛ 0⇔ (1− e)t
n
⋛ e, (3.12)
∂q∗
∂e
⋚ 0⇔ (1− e)t
n
⋛ ee. (3.13)
where e denotes the Euler number. A higher demand elasticity has an am-
biguous impact on equilibrium price and quantity. It can lead to a higher
price as well as to a lower price. The intuition behind this result lies in
the fact that firms can attract additional demand in two ways, via a larger
market share and a larger quantity per consumer. Note, however, that the
revenue per customer p∗q∗ = (1−e)tn decreases in the price elasticity. In
the limiting case of e→ 1, revenue per customer approaches zero.
In the equilibrium with a given number of firms in the market, each firm
makes a profit of
Π∗ =
t(1− e)
n2
. (3.14)
The impact of the demand elasticity on firms’ profits is unambiguous. A
larger demand elasticity reduces profits. This is due to the result that
revenue per customer decreases with the demand elasticity and that the
market share is constant at 1n in equilibrium. Hence, product market com-
petition is tougher as consumers react stronger to price changes. Higher
transportation costs and a smaller number of active firms increase profits.
Result 3.1. For a given number of firms, profits decrease with the demand elas-
ticity.
3.3.2 Entry
Until now the analysis treated the number of firms which offer differen-
tiated products as exogenously given. We now investigate the number of
active firms when it is endogenously determined by the zero profit con-
dition. We assume that to enter, a firm has to incur an entry cost or fixed
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cost of f . Additionally, we treat the number of entrants as a continuous
variable. Setting equation (3.14) equal to f and solving for n yields the
number of entrants:
nc =
√
t(1− e)
f
. (3.15)
The comparative static results concerning transportation costs and fixed
costs are as expected. Higher transportation costs lead to more entry while
higher fixed costs to less entry. The interesting result concerns the impact
of the demand elasticity:
Result 3.2. The number of entrants decreases in the demand elasticity.
A larger demand elasticity leads to less entry into the market. The reason
for this result is that a higher elasticity leads to lower profits for any given
number of firms (see result 3.1).
Corresponding price and quantity in a free-entry equilibrium are:
pc =
[√
1− e√t f ] 11−e , (3.16)
qc =
[√
1− e√t f ]− e1−e . (3.17)
Higher transportation costs and higher fixed costs lead to higher prices
and to lower quantities. As in the equilibrium for a given number of firms,
the impact of the demand elasticity on price and quantity is ambiguous.
More elastic demand may lead to higher or lower prices and quantities.
The model has interesting results in the limiting cases.
Result 3.3. i) With e→ 0, the model reduces to the Salop model. ii) As e→ 1,
the market is monopolized.
When demand is completely inelastic, e → 0, the model reduces to the
Salop model. Thus that model is a special case of the present one. As the
demand elasticity approaches unity, a monopoly is the outcome. Compe-
tition in the market is so tough that as soon as more than one firm enters
the market profits are driven to zero (see equation (3.14)).
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3.4 Welfare
This section considers the welfare and policy implications. We ask whether
there is excess entry into the market as it is the case in models with in-
elastic demand.
In contrast to models with inelastic demand, we have to consider prices
in our welfare analysis as they have an impact on the quantity purchased
and hence on welfare. We define social welfare as the sum of consumer
utility and industry profits:
W = V +Y− 1
1− e p
1−e − 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
tx dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumer welfare
+ p1−e − f n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Industry profits
. (3.18)
We consider two different welfare benchmarks, a first-best benchmark in
which the social planner chooses both the level of entry and the price
charged by firms, and a second-best benchmark in which the social plan-
ner can only control the level of entry, but not prices. Our result are
qualitatively independent of the choice of the welfare benchmark.
3.4.1 First-best benchmark
In the first-best benchmark, the social planner can control prices and level
of entry, that is he maximizes total welfare with respect to p and n. From
equation (3.18), we see that the optimal price set by the regulator is equal
to marginal cost, in this case, p = 0. Inserting this into equation (3.18)
yields
W = V +Y− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
tx dx− f n. (3.19)
The problem for the social planner is then identical to the case with in-
elastic demand, hence reduced to a trade-off between transportation costs
and fixed costs. The optimal number of entrants is
n f =
√
t
4 f
. (3.20)
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Comparison with the free-entry level, nc, leads to the following result:
Result 3.4. Compared to the first-best benchmark, there is excess entry when
e < 34 , insufficient entry when e >
3
4 , and optimal entry when e =
3
4 .
The previous result shows that the result of excess entry in the Salop
model does not hold when demand is elastic. In the model with elas-
tic demand whether there is too much entry or not enough depends on
the demand elasticity. Whenever demand is sufficiently inelastic, there
is excess entry as is the case in the Salop model (e → 0). However, if
the demand elasticity exceeds 34 , there is insufficient entry into the mar-
ket. Only when e = 34 , entry coincides with the socially optimal number.
Thus, the excess entry theorem in spatial models depends crucially on the
assumption of inelastic demand.
3.4.2 Second-best benchmark
Here we derive the welfare-maximizing number of firms given their pric-
ing behavior after entry. Inserting equation (3.10) into (3.18) gives
W = V +Y− t
n
− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
tx dx+
t(1− e)
n
− f n. (3.21)
Maximizing total welfare (3.21) with respect to n yields the optimal num-
ber of firms:10
ns =
√
t(1+ 4e)
4 f
. (3.22)
Comparing the optimal number of firms, ns, with the outcome under free
entry, nc, the following result can be established:
Result 3.5. Compared to the second-best benchmark, there is excess entry when
e < 38 , insufficient entry when e >
3
8 , and optimal entry when e =
3
8 .
Using the second-best benchmark, our result has the same structure as
with the first-best benchmark. For sufficiently inelastic demand, we get
excess entry and for sufficiently elastic demand, we get insufficient entry.
10The second-order condition for maximization is satisfied: − t(1+4e)2n3 < 0.
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3.4.3 Policy implications
Here we derive some policy implications of our welfare analysis focus-
ing on the case of the second-best welfare benchmark. Suppose that a
government agency may either charge a fee against or grant a subsidy to
each entry, e.g. license fee or start-up funds, respectively. Let s denote
the value of such a transfer. When s < 0 we call it a subsidy, and when
s > 0 we call it an entry fee.
Hence the number of firms under such an otherwise “Free Entry” policy
now is:
nc
′
=
√
t(1− e)
f + s
. (3.23)
This, of course, follows directly from equation (3.15) by adjusting the fixed
cost term accordingly. By setting equation (3.23) equal to (3.22), we can
determine the value of s that induces optimal entry into the market. This
value is
s = f
3− 8e
1+ 4e
. (3.24)
The following corollary then immediately follows from result 3.5.
Corollary 3.1. i) When e < 38 , a government agency should charge an entry fee
to reduce excess entry; ii) when e > 38 , a government agency should subsidize
entry.
By such a transfer scheme, a government agency could effectively influ-
ence the number of active firms.
3.5 Power transportation costs
This section reconsiders the analysis assuming a more general transporta-
tion cost function. Instead of linear transportation costs, we now assume
power transportation costs txβ with β ≥ 1. This functional form is also
considered by Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) and Matsumura and
Okamura (2006) which both show that the excess entry theorem always
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holds in the case of inelastic demand.11 Our analysis will show that their
result depends very much on the assumption of inelastic demand.
Following the same steps as in section 3.3, we can derive the number of
entrants in a free-entry equilibrium and the socially optimal number. The
derivation of these results is given in appendix 3.7.
The number of entrants in a free-entry equilibrium is
nc =
[
(1− e)tβ21−β
f
] 1
1+β
, (3.25)
and the optimal number of firms—using the second-best welfare benchmark—
is
nw =
[
tβ2−β(2βe+ 11+β )
f
] 1
1+β
. (3.26)
We denote by e¯ = 1+2β2(1+β)2 the demand elasticity such that optimal and
competitive entry coincides. This leads to the following result:
Result 3.6. Suppose that transportation costs are of the power function form txβ.
Then we have that i) there is excess entry if e < e¯(β) and insufficient entry if
e > e¯(β), and ii) e¯(β) decreases in β.
The first part of the result generalizes result 3.5 for the case of a more
general transportation cost function. It states that as long as demand is
sufficiently inelastic the excess entry theorem still holds. Otherwise it
does not hold. The second part of the result, follows directly as ∂e¯∂β =
− β
(1+β)3 < 0. It says that the interval of demand elasticities for which the
excess entry theorem holds shrinks with β.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce elastic demand in the Salop (1979) model
and investigate if the excess entry theorem still holds. We feature a utility
11Note that existence of price equilibrium is not ensured if β is too high. See Anderson,
de Palma, and Thisse (1992, Ch. 6).
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function that leads to a demand function with constant elasticity. We
find that a larger demand elasticity leads to less entry into the market.
This is a hypothesis that can be tested empirically. Markets with higher
demand elasticity should offer less product variety. In the limiting case of
a unit demand elasticity the market outcome is a monopoly. Turning to
welfare analysis, we show that when demand is sufficiently inelastic there
is excess entry. However, when demand is sufficiently elastic the number
of entrants is lower than the socially optimal number. Further, we provide
conditions on when and how a government intervention can be desirable.
We also show that our results hold with more general transportation cost
functions.
3.7 Appendix
Here we provide the derivation of the results for the model with power
transportation costs. The derivation follows Anderson, de Palma, and
Thisse (1992, Ch. 6), but extended to price-dependent demand.
With power transportation costs, the marginal consumer is implicitly given
by
− 1
1− e p
1−e
i − tx¯β = −
1
1− e p
1−e − t
(
1
n
− x¯
)β
. (3.27)
In contrast to the case of linear transportation costs, it is not possible to
give a closed form for the marginal consumer. However, by total differ-
entiation it is possible to calculate the impact of a price change on the
marginal consumer, which is
dx¯
dpi
= − p
−e
i
tβ(x¯β−1 + ( 1n − x¯)β−1)
. (3.28)
As we are interested in a symmetric equilibrium we can evaluate this
expression at the symmetric equilibrium, that is at x¯ = 12n . Then, we get
dx¯
dpi
∣∣∣x¯= 12n = − p−ei2tβ( 12n )β−1 . (3.29)
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Profits for the representative firm i is Πi = 2x¯p1−ei . The first-order condi-
tion for profit maximization and assuming symmetry gives the following
equilibrium prices for a given number of firms in the market:
p =
[
(1− e) tβ2
1−β
nβ
] 1
1−e
. (3.30)
For β = 1, this gives the results of our base model, and for e = 0, we get
the results of Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992, Ch. 6). Each firm
earns a profit of
(1− e)tβ21−β
nβ+1
− f . (3.31)
The number of firms that enter in a free-entry equilibrium is determined
via the zero-profit condition. This leads to the following number of en-
trants:
nc =
[
(1− e)tβ21−β
f
] 1
1+β
. (3.32)
With power transportation costs the second-best welfare benchmark can
be expressed as:
W = V +Y− tβ2
1−β
nβ
− t
(1+ β)nβ2β
+
(1− e)tβ21−β
nβ
− f n. (3.33)
The number of firms that maximizes total welfare is then
nw =
[
tβ2−β(2βe+ 11+β )
f
] 1
1+β
. (3.34)
Comparison with the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium shows
that there is excess entry if e < 1+2β2(1+β)2 .
69
Chapter 4
Product Variety, Price
Elasticity of Demand and
Fixed Cost in Spatial Models1
4.1 Introduction
Spatial models of product differentiation in the spirit of Hotelling (1929)
and Salop (1979) have been a popular tool in Industrial Organization and
Regional Science. They have been used to study competition in a large
variety of markets and issues.2 Typically, the Hotelling model has been
used to study location decisions by firms while the Salop model has been
used to study entry decisions and market structure. Concerning the Salop
model, one prominent result is the so-called excess entry theorem. It states
that in a free-entry equilibrium, there are always more firms entering into
the market than would be desirable from a welfare point of view. That is,
there is excessive entry into the market. As firms are usually assumed to
be single product firms, the result can also be interpreted as an excess of
product variety provided in the market.3
1This chapter is coauthored with Tobias Wenzel. An earlier version of this chapter is
Gu and Wenzel (2009b).
2E.g., Anderson and Coate (2005) on media markets, Friedman and Thisse (1993) on
collusion, Armstrong (2006) for a study on two-sided markets, and many more.
3With respect to variants of the standard Salop model, Matsumura and Okamura
(2006) find this excess entry result holds for a broad class of transport and production
cost functions.
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However, one underlying, and quite restrictive assumption in the Salop
model, is that consumer demand does not depend on the price of the
product. Each consumer demands a single unit of a differentiated prod-
uct. In consequence, the price then constitutes a mere transfer between
consumers and firms and thus has no impact on total welfare. It is the
aim of the present chapter to lift this assumption of completely inelastic
demand and investigate the consequences of this modification on the va-
lidity of the excess entry theorem. In contrast to a version of the model
with completely inelastic demand, the price of the differentiated product
is no longer a mere transfer between consumer and firm, but has a real
welfare impact by influencing the quantity the consumer demands of the
differentiated product. A higher price now leads to a lower quantity of
the differentiated product and to lower total welfare.
The present chapter explores the relationship between price-dependent
demand and the excess entry theorem in a quite general setting. We
study a setup in which consumer preferences can be represented by a
quasi-linear utility function. We make a mild restriction on the resulting
consumer demand function for the differentiated product, namely we as-
sume that the price elasticity is increasing in the price. This assumption
is satisfied by many demand functions, for instance, linear demand func-
tions.4 In this setup, we establish existence and uniqueness of a symmetric
price equilibrium.
Our main objective is to characterize the welfare properties of the free-
entry equilibrium. We show that unlike the standard Salop model with
completely inelastic demand, the free-entry equilibrium may exhibit ex-
cessive, insufficient or optimal entry. The intuition behind this result is the
following. When setting the price of the product firms have to take two
effects into account. An increase in the price reduces the market share
as well as the quantity sold to each consumer. This second effect—not
present in the standard Salop model with completely inelastic demand—
makes firms more careful when setting the price, and hence leads to a
lower equilibrium price than in the standard model. This, in turn, leads
to lower profits and reduces the incentives to enter the market. Thus,
considering price-dependent demand leads to a downward correction of
4It is also a common assumption in the business literature. See, e.g., Lariviere and
Porteus (2001) and Ziya, Ayhan, and Foley (2003).
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the number of firms which are active in the market. Whether we obtain
excessive or insufficient entry now depends on the strength of consumer
reactions to a price increase. If consumers react only mildly to a price
increase, the downward correction of the equilibrium price and profit is
small, and hence, we still get excessive entry. On the other hand, if con-
sumers react strongly on a price increase the downward correction is large,
and equilibrium price and profit are largely reduced and, in consequence,
we obtain insufficient entry. This chapter obtains conditions for each of
the possible welfare outcomes.
The central message of this chapter is that considering price-dependent
demand is a decisive factor for the welfare results. The excess entry result
may not hold when consumers react to prices by adjusting the quantities
they demand. As the Salop is used as a building block in many applica-
tions, we think one should be careful in interpreting these welfare results
which rely on the assumption of completely inelastic demand. When con-
sidering price-dependent demand these results may change.
In Chapter 3, we provided an example of the issue by considering a spe-
cific functional form for the consumer demand. We employ a demand
function with a constant demand elasticity which enables us to express
equilibrium solutions in closed form. This has the advantage to provide a
simple formulation that is suitable for use in applications. In contrast, the
present chapter aims to study the issue at a general level without relying
on specific forms of consumer demand.
Our result also closes, at least partially, the gap between different ap-
proaches of modeling competition in differentiated product markets. In
representative consumer models, such as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), or in
discrete choice models of product differentiation, for instance see the
overview in Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992), equilibrium entry
can be excessive, insufficient, or optimal depending on the exact model
configuration.
This chapter contributes to a recent literature that introduces price-dependent
demand into spatial models. Related contributions are Boeckem (1994),
Rath and Zhao (2001), Peitz (2002) and Anderson and de Palma (2000).
The first two papers consider variants of the Hotelling framework. Boeckem
(1994) introduces heterogenous consumers with respect to reservation
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prices. Depending on the price charged by firms some consumers choose
not to buy a product. The paper by Rath and Zhao (2001) introduces
elastic demand in the Hotelling framework by assuming that the quantity
demanded by each consumer depends on the price charged. The authors
propose a utility function that is quadratic in the quantity of the differenti-
ated product leading to a linear demand function. In contrast to those two
models we build on the Salop model as we are interested in the relation-
ship between price-dependent demand and entry into the market. Our
approach is closer to Rath and Zhao (2001) as we also assume that each
consumer has a downward sloping demand for the differentiated good
although we do not postulate a specific functional form. Peitz (2002) fea-
tures unit-elastic demand both in Hotelling and Salop settings but focuses
on conditions for existence of Nash equilibrium in prices. He does not
consider entry decisions. Anderson and de Palma (2000) propose a model
that integrates features of spatial models where competition is localized
and representative consumer models where competition is global. In this
model, consumer demand is elastic with a constant demand elasticity. The
study focuses on the interaction between local and global competition.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines
our model. Section 4.3 establishes the existence and uniqueness of the
symmetric price equilibrium and analyzes its properties both for a given
number of firms and under free entry condition. In Section 4.4 we compare
the market equilibrium with the welfare optimal outcomes. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 The model
Here we set up our model. Our aim is to stay close to the original Salop
model as, for instance, outlined in Tirole (1988). The only modification
we make is to introduce price-dependent demand.
4.2.1 Model setup
There is a unit mass of consumers who are uniformly located on a cir-
cle with circumference one. The location of a consumer is denoted by x.
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Consumers derive utility from the consumption of a differentiated prod-
uct and of a homogenous product, which serves as a numeraire good. The
homogenous good is produced in a competitive industry while the differ-
entiated product is produced within an oligopolistic industry. Behavior
in the oligopolistic industry is the focus of our analysis.
We assume that consumers’ utility is quasi-linear. Then, a consumer,
located at x, gains the following utility from consuming a differentiated
product with characteristic xi:
U =
⎧⎨⎩V + v(qD)− t∣x− xi∣+ qH if the differentiated product is consumedqH otherwise,
(4.1)
where qD and qH are the quantity of the differentiated and homogenous
good, respectively. The utility derived by the consumption of the differ-
entiated good consists of three parts. There is a gross utility for consum-
ing this good V. The second utility component depends on the quantity
consumed v(qD); v(qD) is assumed to be continuous and three times dif-
ferentiable with v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. Finally, consumers have to incur
costs of mismatch (transportation cost) if the product’s attributes do not
match consumers’ preferences; these costs are linear in distance and do
not depend on the quantity consumed.5 We assume the gross utility V is
large enough so that no consumer abstains from buying the differentiated
product. Note also that there is decreasing marginal utility in the quantity
of the differentiated product.
Each consumer is endowed with wealth Y which she can spend on the
two commodities, the differentiated product and the numeraire good. We
restrict consumers to consume only one variant of the differentiated prod-
uct. Let us denote the price of the differentiated product by p and nor-
malize the price of the numeraire good to 1. Then each consumer faces
the following budget constraint:
Y = p ⋅ qD + qH. (4.2)
5Transport costs are one time costs independent of the quantity. As an interpretation
these could be costs for driving to a shopping mall. Alternatively, one could also assume
transport costs to depend on the quantity. These would be a plausible assumption if the
horizontal dimension is interpreted as a taste dimension.
74
The differentiated product is offered by an oligopolistic industry with
n ≥ 2 firms each offering a single variant. We are not interested in location
patterns. Hence, we assume that these firms are located equidistantly on
the unit circle.6 The distance between two neighboring firms then is 1n .
To model competition in this market, we study the following three stage
game. In the first stage firms may enter the market. In the second stage,
firms compete in prices. In the third stage, consumers choose a supplier
of the differentiated product and the quantity.
4.2.2 Demand for the differentiated product
We start by deriving individual demand for the differentiated product.
Suppose a consumer has decided to choose a certain supplier i. Then,
the quantity she demands is the solution to the following maximization
problem:
max
qD ,qH
u(qD, qH) = V + v(qD) + qH
s.t. p ⋅ qD + qH = Y
qD, qH ≥ 0.
A consumer’s demand for the differentiated good is determined by maxi-
mizing utility (equation (4.1)) under the budget constraint (equation (4.2)).
We further assume that Y is sufficiently large such that the demand for the
homogenous good is always positive. Then, by solving v′ (qD) = p we get
a downward sloping individual demand function for the differentiated
product q(p). Since v(qD) is continuous and three times differentiable,
q(p) is continuous and twice differentiable in (0,Q) where Q < +∞ is the
up-bound of demand obtained when p = 0.
Our assumption of quasi-linearity becomes convenient when expressing
indirect utility. The surplus associated with the demand function q(p)
when a consumer located at x buys the differentiated product from a firm
6See Economides (1989) for the existence of symmetric location equilibria in the model
with unit demand.
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located at xi at a price pi < pˆ is
Uˆ = V +Y+
∫ pˆ
pi
q (p) dp− t∣x− xi∣, (4.3)
where pˆ denotes the minimum price where the function q(p) becomes
zero.
4.2.3 Marginal consumer and demand
Given the symmetric structure of the model, we seek for a symmetric
equilibrium. Therefore we derive demand of a representative firm i which
for convenience is designated to be located at zero. Suppose that this firm
charges a price of pi while all remaining firms charge a price of po. Then
the marginal consumer is the consumer indifferent between choosing to
buy from firm i and the neighboring firm located at 1n . Using equation
(4.3) the marginal consumer (x¯) is implicitly given by
V +Y+
∫ pˆ
pi
q (p) dp− tx¯ = V +Y+
∫ pˆ
po
q (p) dp− t
(
1
n
− x¯
)
,
or explicitly by
x¯ =
1
2n
+
1
2t
∫ po
pi
q (p) dp. (4.4)
As each firm faces two adjacent firms, the number of consumers choos-
ing to buy from firm i is 2x¯. According to the demand function, each
consumer buys an amount of q (pi). Hence total demand at firm i is:
Di = 2x¯ ⋅ q (pi) . (4.5)
In contrast to the standard model with completely inelastic demand, total
demand consists now of two parts: market share and quantity per con-
sumer. When choosing prices firms have to take into account both effects.
An increase in price reduces market share as well as the quantity that can
be sold to each customer. This second effect is not present in the standard
model.
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4.3 Analysis
This section analyzes the equilibrium. In a first step we characterize the
price equilibrium for a given number of firms and provide conditions for
the existence. In a second step, we seek to determine the number of firms
that enter.
4.3.1 Price equilibrium
We look for a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms charge the same
price. Assuming zero production costs, the profit of a representative firm
i when this firm charges a price pi and all remaining firms charge a price
po is given by:
Πi = Di ⋅ pi =
[
1
n
+
1
t
∫ po
pi
q (p) dp
]
q (pi) pi. (4.6)
To find profit maximizing price pi, we first derive the first order derivative,
dΠi
dpi
= −1
t
pi [q (pi)]
2 +
[
1
n
+
1
t
∫ po
pi
q (p) dp
] [
q (pi) + pi
dq (p)
dp
∣∣∣
p=pi
]
.
(4.7)
By setting equation (4.7) to zero we obtain the following necessary condi-
tion,
[q (pi)]
2 pi
1
t
=
[
1
n
+
1
t
∫ po
pi
q (p) dp
] [
q (pi) + pi
dq (p)
dp
∣∣∣
p=pi
]
. (4.8)
For the moment let us suppose that a symmetric price equilibrium exists.
Later we will turn to this issue and provide existence conditions. Applying
symmetry to the first-order condition, a symmetric price equilibrium is
characterized by:
q (p∗) p∗ =
t
n
[
1+
p∗
q (p∗)
dq (p)
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
]
. (4.9)
Note that the last part of equation (4.9) includes the price elasticity of
individual demand evaluated at the equilibrium price. After the follow-
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ing definition, we express this equilibrium condition in terms of price
elasticity of demand.
Definition 4.1. Denote the absolute value of price elasticity of demand ε as
ε = − p
q(p)
dq(p)
dp
.
Equation (4.9) now can be rewritten as
q (p∗) p∗ =
t
n
[1− ε∗] . (4.10)
We use this condition to state corresponding equilibrium profits. Inserting
equation (4.9) into equation (4.6) we get
Π∗ =
t
n2
[
1+
p∗
q (p∗)
dq (p)
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
]
=
t
n2
[1− ε∗] . (4.11)
It can be seen immediately that there is a negative relationship between
equilibrium demand elasticity and equilibrium profit.
4.3.2 Equilibrium existence
Now we provide conditions that ensure existence of a symmetric price
equilibrium as stated in equation (4.10). We start with a preliminary
result:
Lemma 4.1. In equilibrium, demand is inelastic, that is, ε∗ < 1.
Proof. see appendix.
This result reveals that analogous to a monopolist who sets the price to
reach unit elasticity, a firm in the current model will only set price at the
inelastic segment of the demand function.
To ensure existence, we have to impose some additional structure on the
demand function. We introduce the following assumption:7
7This assumption is sufficient but not necessary for the existence of a symmetric price
equilibrium.
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Assumption 4.1. The absolute value of price elasticity of demand ε is strictly
increasing in p ∈ (0, pˆ) and limp→ pˆ ε(p) = limp→ pˆ ε∣p ≥ 1.
When ε is strictly increasing in p, it is shown in the literature that the
individual consumer revenue function R(p) = pq(p) is strictly unimodal
over the entire interval of strictly positive demand. For a discussion on this
point see Ziya, Ayhan, and Foley (2004). Strict unimodality of R(p) means
that pq(p) has a unique global maximum p˜ in (0, pˆ) and if p1 and p2 are
two points in (0, pˆ) such that p1 < p2 < p˜ or p˜ < p1 < p2 then R(p1) <
R(p2) < R( p˜) or R(p2) < R(p1) < R( p˜), respectively.8 Apparently a
profit maximizing monopolist will set p = p˜ when no production cost is
involved and it’s well known that ε( p˜) = 1. When price p goes down
from p˜, both price elasticity of the demand ε and product revenue R(p)
strictly decrease.
As an example, one functional form that satisfies assumption 4.1 is a linear
demand function of the type q = a− bp or a quadratic function of the form
q = a− bp2, where both a and b are suitable positive constants.9
Under Assumption 1, we are now ready to establish the existence of a
unique symmetric price equilibrium given by equation (4.10).
Proposition 4.1. For any given number of firms n ≥ 2, there exists a unique
symmetric price equilibrium identified by condition (4.10), namely, q (p∗) p∗ =
t
n [1− ε∗].
Proof. see appendix.
It is relatively straightforward to verify the existence of the symmetric
price equilibrium when firms have no incentive to undercut their neigh-
bors and to establish its uniqueness. By constructing an auxiliary demand
function, we show that undercutting is not possible. The detailed proof
is relegated to the Appendix.
8This representation follows Bertsekas (1999) and it is also adopted by Ziya, Ayhan,
and Foley (2004).
9In both examples, the maximum value of the elasticity is obviously larger than 1.
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4.3.3 Properties of price equilibrium
We can now study the properties of the price equilibrium. Lemma 4.2
below states the comparative statics effect of the number of firms which
are active in the market and of transportation costs on equilibrium price,
equilibrium price elasticity and firm profit.
Lemma 4.2. Comparative statics.
1. Equilibrium price, price elasticity of demand and firm profit decrease in the
number of entrants, that is, dp
∗
dn < 0,
dε∗
dn < 0 and
dΠ∗
dn < 0.
2. Equilibrium price, price elasticity of demand and firm profit increase in
transportation costs, that is, dp
∗
dt > 0,
dε∗
dt > 0 and
dΠ∗
dt > 0.
Proof. see appendix.
Unsurprisingly, the larger the number of firms the lower the price. Profits
also decrease with the number of firms in the market. Additionally, the
demand elasticity decreases with the number of firms in the market. This
follows from our assumption that the demand elasticity increases in the
price. The impact of transportation costs on prices and profits is the
same as in standard location models. Prices and profits increase with
transportation costs.
4.3.4 Entry
Until now the analysis has treated the number of firms which offer differ-
entiated products as exogenously given. We now investigate the number
of active firms when it is endogenously determined by a zero profit con-
dition. We assume that to enter, a firm has to incur an entry cost or fixed
cost of f . Additionally, we treat the number of entrants as a continu-
ous variable. Setting equation (4.11) equal to f determines implicitly the
number of firms that enter. We denote this number by nc:
t
(nc)2
(1− ε∗nc) = f . (4.12)
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In general, it is not possible to express the number of entrants explic-
itly as the equilibrium demand elasticity (ε∗nc) depends on the number of
competitors. In this chapter, we have assumed that the market is viable
for at least two firm. So the fixed costs must not be prohibitively high:
f ≤ F = t4 (1− ε∗n=2). Thus, we only consider fixed costs in f ∈ (0, F).10
We know from Lemma 4.2 that profits decrease monotonically in the num-
ber of firms. Hence, we know that a solution to equation (4.12) exists and
is unique.
The comparative static results concerning transportation costs and fixed
costs are as expected. Higher transportation costs lead to more entry while
higher fixed costs to less entry, that is, dncdt > 0 and
dnc
d f < 0. This follows
immediately from Lemma 4.2.
Later, it will turn out that equilibrium demand elasticity is a crucial factor
for our welfare results. Thus, we are interested in its properties. With en-
dogenous entry, equilibrium demand elasticity is essentially a function of
the exogenous variables, fixed costs and transportation costs. When fixed
costs are low, a large number of firms enter which decreases equilibrium
demand elasticity (as shown in Lemma 4.2). Converse is the impact of
transportation costs. High transportation costs lead to a large number of
entrants, and hence, to a low demand elasticity. Formally,
Lemma 4.3. Equilibrium price elasticity increases in fixed costs and decreases
in transportation costs, that is, dε
∗
nc
d f > 0 and
dε∗nc
dt < 0.
Proof. dε
∗
nc
d f =
dε∗
dn
dnc
d f > 0, as
dε∗
dn < 0 by lemma 4.2 and
dnc
d f < 0 from above.
dε∗nc
dt =
dε∗
dn
dnc
dt < 0, as
dε∗
dn < 0 by lemma 4.2 and
dnc
dt > 0 from above.
Hence, because of these strictly monotone relationships, there is a one-to-
one relationship between equilibrium demand elasticity and fixed costs or
transportation costs, respectively. For instance, for each value of fixed cost
f ∈ (0, F) we can identify the corresponding equilibrium price elasticity
ε∗( f ) ∈ (0, ε∗n=2) , and vice versa. The same applies to transportation costs.
We will make use of these relationships when expressing welfare results.
10Alternatively, this can be re-stated in terms of transportation costs: t > 4 f1−ε∗n=2 = T.
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4.4 Welfare
This section considers the welfare implications. We ask whether there is
excess entry into the market as it is the case in models with completely
inelastic demand.
In contrast to models with completely inelastic demand, we have to con-
sider prices in our welfare analysis as they have an impact on the quantity
purchased and hence on welfare. We define social welfare as the sum of
consumer utility and industry profits:
W = V +Y+
∫ pˆ
p
q (p) dp− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
tx dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumer welfare
+
t
n
[1− ε∗n]− f n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Industry profits
. (4.13)
We consider a first-best benchmark, in which the social planner can control
prices and the level of entry, that is, she maximizes total welfare with
respect to p and n.11 From equation (4.13), we see that the optimal price
is equal to marginal cost, in this case, p = 0. Inserting this into equation
(4.13) yields
W = V +Y+
∫ pˆ
0
q (p) dp− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
tx dx− f n. (4.14)
The problem for the social planner is then identical to the case with com-
pletely inelastic demand, hence reduced to a trade-off between transporta-
tion costs and fixed costs. The optimal number of entrants is
n f =
√
t
4 f
. (4.15)
To shape intuition, it is useful to start with a preliminary result:
11Our results derived below will not change qualitatively if a second-best benchmark
is used, i.e., if the social planner can only control the level of entry but not the price. The
reason is, the second-best benchmark level of entry is generally higher than the first-best
level since at the first-best level of entry without price regulation there is additional benefit
of further entry resulting from the reduced difference between market price and marginal
cost. Therefore, if market entry is insufficient compared to the first-best benchmark, this
is also true compared to the second-best benchmark.
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Lemma 4.4. There is excess entry if ε∗nc < 34 , insufficient entry if ε
∗
nc >
3
4 , and
optimal entry if ε∗nc = 34 .
Lemma 4.4 can easily be derived by comparing equations (4.12) and (4.15).
This lemma provides conditions for the existence of excessive, insufficient,
and optimal entry. If the equilibrium demand elasticity is sufficiently low
we get excess entry as in the standard model with completely inelastic
demand. If, on the other hand, equilibrium demand elasticity exceeds 34 ,
there is insufficient entry into the market. The intuition behind the result
can be seen in equation (4.11). The higher equilibrium demand elasticity
is, the lower the profits are; and hence the smaller the incentives to enter
the market will be.
However, the equilibrium demand elasticity is endogenous in this model.
Thus, our aim is to state the welfare result in terms of exogenous variables.
Now we can make use of the monotone relationship between equilibrium
demand elasticity and fixed costs of entry. Entry is excessive (insufficient)
if fixed costs are such that ε∗nc < 34 (ε
∗
nc >
3
4 ). This leads to:
Proposition 4.2. Welfare result.
1. Suppose ε∗n=2 ≥ 34 and define f as the fixed cost level that leads to equi-
librium price elasticity ε∗nc = 34 . Then there is excess entry if f < f ,
insufficient entry if f > f and optimal entry if f = f .
2. Suppose ε∗n=2 <
3
4 , then there is excess entry for all f ∈ (0, F].
Proof. see appendix.
Proposition 4.2 contains the main contribution of the chapter. When ac-
counting for price-dependent demand the excess entry result of the stan-
dard model with completely inelastic demand needs not hold. In the
proposition we have to consider two cases. First, if the demand function
is such that ε∗n=2 ≥ 34 . Then, if fixed costs of entry are high such that the
corresponding equilibrium demand elasticity is high, entry into the mar-
ket is insufficient. Conversely, if fixed costs are low, the number of firms
that enter is high which leads to a low demand elasticity. And hence,
entry into the market is excessive. The second case we have to consider
is a demand function which has the property such that ε∗n=2 < 34 . As ε
∗
nc
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decreases in n, ε∗nc < 34 for all values of fixed costs ( f ∈ (0, F)). And thus,
there is always excess entry in this case.
Alternatively, it is also possible to restate the welfare result in terms of
transportation costs. This is formally done in the appendix. There, we
show that insufficient entry is possible if transportation costs are suffi-
ciently low.
4.5 Example
The analysis before was quite general. To illustrate our results, we pro-
vide an example using a linear demand function for individual consumer
demand for the differentiated product. Suppose that
q(p) =
1
2
− p, (4.16)
with an associated (absolute) demand elasticity of
ε =
p
1
2 − p
. (4.17)
We set transportation costs equal to one and solve for the free-entry equi-
librium. It is not possible to solve it analytically, so we turn to a numerical
solution. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the results of this numerical analysis.
Figure 4.1 displays the number of entrants in the free-entry equilibrium
(solid line) vs. optimal entry (dashed) for different values of fixed costs
of entry f and thus illustrates Proposition 4.2. The figure shows that for
low levels of fixed cost ( f < f¯ = 0.014994), there is excessive entry into
the market and for high levels of fixed costs ( f > f¯ = 0.014994) there is
insufficient entry in the market.12
Figure 4.2 displays the corresponding equilibrium demand elasticity (ε∗nc)
for given values of f . In line with the previous figure and with Lemma
12Proposition 4.2 provides a simple way to check whether insufficient entry is compat-
ible with a certain demand function and transportation costs. It suffices to compute the
demand elasticity evaluated at n = 2. If the demand elasticity is smaller than 34 , there
is always excess entry. If, however, the demand elasticity exceeds 34 , we know that there
exists some level of fixed cost f¯ with f > f¯ leading to insufficient entry and f < f¯ leading
to excessive entry.
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium (solid curve) vs. optimal entry (dashed curve)
4.4, equilibrium demand elasticity is lower than ε∗nc < 34 for f < f¯ and is
larger than 34 for f > f¯ .
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced price-dependent demand into the Salop model.
Our analysis focuses on the welfare implications of this generalization of
the original model outlined by Salop. While in the model with com-
pletely inelastic demand the excess entry result holds, this is no longer
true when accounting for price-dependent demand. Results are not that
clear-cut anymore. Entry or product variety, respectively, can be excessive,
insufficient, or optimal.
As the Salop model is widely used in all sorts of applications, we believe
that our results are of some importance. In the light of the present chap-
ter, accounting for price-dependent demand may lead to different welfare
conclusions.
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium demand elasticity
4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof: Note when ε ≥ 1 i.e., dq(p)dp pq(p) ≤ −1, the first order derivative (4.7)
dΠi
dpi
= − [q (pi)]2 pi 1t︸ ︷︷ ︸
negative
+
[
1
n
+
1
t
∫ po
pi
q (p) dp
]
q (pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive
[
1+
pi
q (pi)
dq (p)
dp
∣∣∣
p=pi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-positive
(4.18)
obtains a strictly negative value. The middle part in the right-hand side
of (4.18) is positive because we are interested in symmetric equilibrium
(pi = po). With dΠidpi being negative, whenever demand elasticity exceeds
or is equal to 1, a firm wants to reduce price in order to boost demand.
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In equilibrium, whenever it exists, however, the F.O.C. (4.9) holds,
1+
p∗
q (p∗)
dq (p)
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
> 0
=⇒ p
∗
q (p∗)
dq (p)
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
> −1
=⇒ ε∗ < 1.
This concludes the proof.
4.7.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof: The structure of the proof is the following. We first show that the
necessary first order condition (4.10) admits a unique solution. Second,
we prove that under the condition of symmetric price and without under-
cutting, firm profit is quasi-concave in the strategy variable pi. Last we
show that firms have no incentive to undercut neighbors when they are
in the situation identified by the first order condition.
1) Define ∆(p) = q (p) p− tn [1− ε(p)]. Because v(qD) is continuous and
three times differentiable, q(p) and ε(p) are continuous and differen-
tiable. Hence, ∆(p) is continuous. Note that
lim
p→0
∆(p) = 0− t
n
[
1− lim
p→0
ε(p)
]
= 0− t
n
< 0
and for the individual consumer (R(p) = pq(p)) revenue-maximizing
p˜,
∆( p˜) = q ( p˜) p˜ > 0.
Because of continuity, ∆(p) = 0 obtains solution(s) for p ∈ (0, p˜). Take
the derivative of ∆(p),
d∆(p)
dp
=
dR(p)
dp
+
t
n
dε(p)
dp
.
Following Assumption 4.1, dε(p)dp > 0; since R(p) is strictly unimodal, for
p ∈ (0, p˜), dR(p)dp > 0 as well. Hence, we conclude d∆(p)dp > 0. Because of
this monotonicity, ∆(p) = 0 obtains a unique solution in (0, p˜). When
p ∈ [ p˜, pˆ), we know ε(p) ≥ 1 which means ∆(p) > 0 for [ p˜, pˆ). So
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the solution given by q (p) p = tn [1− ε(p)] for p ∈ (0, p˜) is the unique
solution.
2) Take derivative of the F.O.C. (4.7),
d2Πi
dp2i
=− 1
t
(
[q(pi)]
2 + 2piq(pi)
dq
dp
∣∣∣
p=pi
)
− 1− ε(pi)
t
[q(pi)]
2
+
[
1
n
+
1
t
∫ po
pi
q (p) dp
] (
(1− ε(pi)) dqdp
∣∣∣
p=pi
− q(pi) dεdp
∣∣∣
p=pi
)
.
We know when the first order condition under symmetric price holds,
q (p∗) p = tn [1− ε(p∗)]. Evaluate the second order derivative at p∗,
d2Πi
dp2i
∣∣∣
p=p∗
=− 1
t
(
[q(p∗)]2 + 2p∗q(p∗)
dq
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
)
− np
∗q(p∗)
t2
[q(p∗)]2
+
[
1
n
+
1
t
∫ p∗
p∗
q (p) dp
] (
np∗q(p∗)
t
dq
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
− q(p∗) dε
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
)
=− p
∗q(p∗)
t
dq
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
− q
2(p∗)
t
− np
∗q3(p∗)
t2
− q(p
∗)
n
dε
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
=− q
2(p∗)
t
(1− ε(p∗))− np
∗q3(p∗)
t2
− q(p
∗)
n
dε
dp
∣∣∣
p=p∗
.
(4.19)
Since price elasticity is increasing in price
(
dε
dp
∣∣∣
p=pi
> 0
)
and when-
ever the first order condition holds (1− ε(p∗)) > 0, the right hand side
of equation (4.19) is strictly negative for ∀pi ∈ (0, p˜). In consequence,
any firm’s profit function is necessarily strictly concave whenever con-
dition (4.10) holds. Hence for all of the firms, firm payoff is strictly
quasiconcave in strategy variable pi.
3) In this step we verify if any firm would have incentive to undercut its
neighbors. For a firm to undercut its closest neighbors, the price it
sets has to be low enough to attract consumers with a distance further
than 1n . Using consumer’s indirect utility function, for 0 < pi < p
∗ the
following condition has to hold.
∫ pˆ
pi
q(p)dp− t
n
+Y+V ≥
∫ pˆ
p∗
q(p)dp+Y+V
⇐⇒
∫ p∗
pi
q(p)dp ≥ t
n
. (4.20)
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To investigate condition (4.20), we first prepare an additional result
(i.e., inequality (4.23) below) for further use. By solving (4.10) we will
have equilibrium price p∗, the corresponding demand q∗ = q(p∗) and
price elasticity ε∗ = ε(p∗). Define constant
ϕ =
q∗
(p∗)−ε
∗ .
We construct an auxiliary demand function with constant elasticity ε∗,
q†(p) = ϕp−ε
∗
which also passes through the point (p∗, q∗). With this demand func-
tion we can obtain the following closed form formula for 0 < pi < p∗,
∫ p∗
pi
ϕp−ε
∗
dp =
ϕ
1− ε∗ p
1−ε∗
∣∣∣p∗
pi
. (4.21)
Applying the necessary condition for symmetric equilibrium 1− ε∗ =
n
t p
∗q (p∗), equation (4.21) becomes
∫ p∗
pi
ϕp−ε
∗
dp =
q∗
(p∗)−ε
∗
t
np∗q∗
(
(p∗)1−ε
∗ − (pi)1−ε∗
)
=
t
n
(p∗)1−ε∗ − (pi)1−ε∗
(p∗)1−ε
∗
=
t
n
(
1−
(
pi
p∗
)1−ε∗)
.
Since 0 ≤ 1− ε∗ < 1 and 0 < pi < p∗, we have
∫ p∗
pi
ϕp−ε
∗
dp <
t
n
, ∀ pi ∈ (0, p∗). (4.22)
Note also that q†(p) = ϕp−ε∗ has a constant elasticity ε∗ while q(p)
obtains elasticity ε∗ at the point (p∗, q∗) but strictly lower elasticity
ε < ε∗ when price decreases. That is, for the same percentage decrease
of price, although q(p) and q†(p) start out at the same point (p∗, q∗),
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q(p) increase less than q†(p) does. Hence,
q(p) < ϕp−ε
∗ , for ∀ p ∈ (0, p∗)
=⇒
∫ p∗
pi
q(p)dp <
∫ p∗
pi
ϕp−ε
∗
dp, for ∀ pi ∈ (0, p∗).
By condition (4.22) we have the next result,
∫ p∗
pi
q(p)dp <
t
n
for ∀ pi ∈ (0, p∗). (4.23)
Now we are ready to discuss the undercutting strategy for firm i facing
consumer demand function q(p). To undercut its neighbors who are
charging the symmetric equilibrium price p∗, condition (4.20) has to
hold. Because of the result we established in (4.23), there exists no
positive price that satisfies condition (4.20). Hence there is no firm
who is able to take over neighbor’s business without losing money.
4) We have shown that for any n ≥ 2, there exists a unique solution to
condition (4.10). Moreover, the strategy profile characterized by this
condition is indeed an equilibrium because firms’ payoffs are strictly
quasiconcave in own strategy and there is no incentive for firms to
undercut neighbors. This concludes the proof.
4.7.3 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof:
1. Take total differentiation of equation (4.10) with respect to the num-
ber of firms,
dq∗
dp
dp∗
dn
p∗ + q∗
dp∗
dn
=
t
n
(
−dε
∗
dp
dp∗
dn
)
− (1− ε∗) t
n2
=⇒
(
dq∗
dp
p∗ + q∗
)
dp∗
dn
= − t
n
dε∗
dp
dp∗
dn
− t
n2
(1− ε∗)
=⇒dp
∗
dn
(
q∗(1− ε∗) + t
n
dε∗
dp
)
= − t
n2
(1− ε∗)
=⇒dp
∗
dn
=
− tn2 (1− ε∗)
q(1− ε∗) + tn dε
∗
dp
.
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Since (1− ε∗) > 0 by Lemma 4.1 and dε∗dp > 0, in equilibrium dp
∗
dn < 0.
Also from Assumption 4.1
dε∗
dn
=
dε∗
dp
dp∗
dn
< 0.
Differentiate equation (4.11) with respect to n:
dΠ∗
dn
=− 2t
n3
(1− ε∗)− t
n2
dε∗
dn
=− t
n3
(1− ε∗)
[
2− t
n
dε∗
dp
(
1
q∗(1− ε∗) + tn dε
∗
dp
)]
=− t
n3
(1− ε∗)
2q∗(1− ε∗) + tn dε
∗
dp
q∗(1− ε∗) + tn dε
∗
dp
< 0.
2. Take total differentiation of equation (4.10) with respect to trans-
portation costs,
dq∗
dp
dp∗
dt
p∗ + q∗
dp∗
dt
= − t
n
(
dε∗
dp
dp∗
dt
)
+ (1− ε∗) 1
n
=⇒dp
∗
dt
(
q∗(1− ε∗) + t
n
dε∗
dp
)
=
1
n
(1− ε∗)
=⇒dp
∗
dt
=
1
n (1− ε∗)
q∗(1− ε∗) + tn dε
∗
dp
> 0.
It follows:
dε∗
dt
=
dε
dp
dp∗
dt
=
dε
dp
1
n (1− ε∗)
q∗(1− ε∗) + tn dε
∗
dp
> 0.
Differentiate equation (4.11) with respect to transportation costs:
dΠ∗
dt
=
1
n2
(1− ε∗)− t
n2
dε∗
dt
=
1
n2
(1− ε∗)
[
1− t
n
dε
dp
(
1
q∗(1− ε∗) + tn dεdp
)]
=
1
n2
(1− ε∗) q
∗(1− ε∗)
q∗(1− ε∗) + tn dε
∗
dp
> 0.
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4.7.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof: From Lemma 4.3, we know that equilibrium elasticity under free
entry increases in fixed cost. From Lemma 4.4, we know that nc > n f
when ε∗nc < 34 , n
c = n f when ε∗nc = 34 , and n
c < n f when ε∗nc > 34 .
We have to consider two cases:
1. ε∗n=2 ≥ 34 . Then, there exists a fixed cost f¯ such that the resulting
equilibrium demand elasticity is equal to 34 . Since ε
∗
nc increases in
f , for f < f¯ , ε∗nc < 34 which leads to excessive entry by Lemma 4.4.
Conversely, for f > f¯ , ε∗nc > 34 which means insufficient entry.
2. ε∗n=2 < 34 . Then, since ε
∗
nc decreases in n, ε∗nc < 34 for all values of f .
And hence, there is excess entry.
We can also reformulate Proposition 4.2 in terms of transportation costs.
What we need first is to show that there is a monotone relationship be-
tween equilibrium demand elasticity and transportation costs. This is
dε∗nc
dt =
dε
dn
dn
dt < 0, as
dε
dn < 0 from Lemma 4.2 and
dn
dt > 0.
Again, we must distinguish the two cases:
1. ε∗n=2 ≥ 34 . Then, there exists a transportation cost t¯ such that the
resulting equilibrium demand elasticity is equal to 34 . Since ε
∗
nc de-
creases in t, for t > t¯, ε∗nc < 34 which leads to excessive entry by
Lemma 4.4. Conversely, for t < t¯, ε∗nc > 34 which means insufficient
entry.
2. ε∗n=2 < 34 . Then, since ε
∗
nc decreases in n, ε∗nc < 34 for all values of t.
And hence, there is excess entry.
We state the result formally as a corollary:
Corollary 4.1. Welfare result in terms of transportation costs.
1. Suppose ε∗n=2 ≥ 34 and define t as the transportation cost level that leads
to equilibrium price elasticity ε∗ of 34 . Then there is excess entry if t > t,
insufficient entry if t < t and optimal entry if t = t.
2. Suppose ε∗n=2 <
3
4 , then there is excess entry for all t > T.
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Chapter 5
Gift Giving and Concern for
Face
The Widow’s Offering
And he called unto him his disciples, and saith unto them, Verily I
say unto you, That this poor widow hath cast more in, than all they
which have cast into the treasury: For all they did cast in of their
abundance; but she of her want did cast in all that she had, even all
her living. — Mark 12: 43–44
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Theories of gift giving
People voluntarily contribute to public goods, make charitable transfers to
the needy and give gifts to others. Explanations for such behavior are not
apparent from the point of view of neoclassical economic theory. A rea-
sonable attempt was to admit the total provision of public goods into indi-
vidual preferences together with private consumptions (see, for example,
McGuire (1974), Warr (1982), Roberts (1984) and Bergstrom, Blume, and
Varian (1986)). However, Andreoni (1988) shows that such a pure altruism
model typically leads to prevailing of free-riding in large economies. This
framework also predicts that government spending on public goods will
crowd out equal amount of private donation while empirical studies find
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such crowding out is rather small.1 These issues can be addressed by the
inclusion of the act of giving into individual preferences. The argument
is that private donation may also be motivated by social or psychological
concerns such as esteem, prestige, social pressure or simply a feeling of a
warm glow. A large body of sociological, psychological, and anthropolog-
ical research supports this view and important contributions employing
this impure altruism approach in economic studies have been presented
by, for example, Arrow (1972), Margolis (1981), Andreoni (1989, 1990),
McClelland (1989) among many others.
5.1.2 Warm glow
Harbaugh (1998a, 1998b) further differentiates two distinctive types of
“joy of giving” that may be derived from the act of donation. The first
is the “intrinsic benefit” which a donor enjoys because of her own moral
concerns and only requires her own knowledge of the act of giving. For
instance, a donor is happier after a donation because only then she feels
she is entitled to think herself as a good person. The other is the “prestige
benefit” which comes from a donor’s social concerns and is only obtained
when the act of giving is publicly recognized. In this case, a donor’s
decision is influenced by how others think about himself. See, for example,
Deci and Ryan (1985), Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg (2003) for studies
of moral motivation and Holla¨nder (1990), Lindbeck (1997) for studies of
social acceptance.
Though the literature of warm glow has convincingly argued and exten-
sively studied the relevance of the demand for warm glow, what remains
less investigated is the supply or the production technology of it. In the so-
cial concern case obviously, from the same $100 donation to a charity, the
“prestige” one enjoys when he is the only donor differs to what one would
claim, if any, when he was just one of the one hundred $100-donors. In
other words, how much prestige one could enjoy from his own donation
depends also on how much others have given. Moreover, same amount
of donation also tends to be judged differently when it comes from differ-
1Theoretical prediction on crowding-out is shown in, for example, Warr (1982), Roberts
(1984), Bernheim (1986) and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986); empirical evidences
have been provided by Abrams and Schmitz (1978), Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995),
Payne (1998) and more recently Garrett and Rhine (2007), among others.
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ent donors. A $100 donation from a poor person will usually be praised
higher than a $100 donation from a wealthy person.
Parallel arguments can also be made even when only internal intrinsic
benefit is relevant. In this case, the one who “judges” is not the “society”
but one’s own moral. It’s not uncommon when people make voluntary
contributions they acknowledge the reason being “doing my bit”. Then
the question is, how much is a “bit”? One story could be like this: Suppose
there is a way a person can find out the total income and total charitable
donation of all of his fellow countrymen, then he will be able to compute
the aggregate donation-income ratio.2 If a person treats such a ratio as
a reasonable reference point or the “bit”, the higher his own donation-
income ratio above this reference point, the better he may look to himself
in the mirror. Likewise, if one knows others have donated so much out
of their own moderate income, esteem might not be a very significant
motivation for his one penny donation.
5.1.3 The concept of face
When donations are visible to the public, each of them is seen differ-
ently by the society and comparison of individual donations is inevitable
in many situations. The motivation of private donation identified herein
falls into the warm glow approach since a donor directly benefits from
the act of giving, but it differs from what prestige, honor, esteem, dignity,
social status or social norm may refer to. It is, therefore, conceptually ap-
pealing to introduce the concept of face to the analysis of current situation
although it is arguably more relevant in some communities than others.
“Face is the respectability and/or deference which a person can
claim for himself from others, by virtue of the relative position
he occupies in his social network and the degree to which he is
judged to have functioned adequately in that position as well
as acceptably in his general conduct;......” — Ho (1976), page
883, American Journal of Sociology, 81(4)
2Such statistics of national income and national charitable donation are published in
many countries.
95
Face is important for an individual to function properly within the com-
munity though the degree of the importance varies from one part of the
world to another. The idea is that each one has a face which can either be
improved or lost to a certain extent depending on, for example, whether
one has donated sufficiently compared to what ought to be contributed
based on the position he occupies in our context. If the relative posi-
tions are assigned according to individual’s income, individual donations
will be judged along with the donor’s income level. However, the exact
amount that ought to be contributed for each position is not a written rule.
It depends on how much others have donated. In this sense, concern for
face is not strictly a social norm since it does not prescribe what one has
to do (see, Elster (1989)). Indeed, the criteria based on which individual’s
behavior is judged are endogenously determined. Face is also not status.
If an individual “functioned adequately” in his relatively low status, he
can still be possessing a sound face.
Though by definition face is a social concept, the approach proposed in
this chapter is also capable of addressing entirely morally motivated do-
nations. It therefore does not require that each donation has to be seen
by others nor individuals have to care about what others think about
themselves so long as they do care whether themselves have functioned
adequately according to a certain type of standards. This chapter hence
extends and complements studies of both intrinsic and prestige type of
benefits by investigating what kind of warm glow it could be and how it
influences individual decision making.
Glazer and Konrad (1996)’s signaling explanation for charity is the closest
paper to the present work for the fact that both place interests primarily
on the impact of one donor’s donation on others’ enjoyment of warm
glow.3 In their paper, donations are observable and in equilibrium a
more “generous” donation signals a higher income level of that donor.
Hence the benefit one derives from the act of giving comes from the fact
that others get to know the donor’s income level and to be known to
have high income is important. While their model addresses situations in
which individual income is completely unobservable, this chapter refers to
3Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) is a more elaborated and general contribution to the
problem of game of status and positional consumption. When donation is seen as a special
case of positional consumption, their model supports Glazer and Konrad (1996).
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situations in which individuals’ income is directly or indirectly observable
along with individual donations, when the relevant concern is face. In the
case of pure moral concerns, both individual income level and donation
can be completely unobservable.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the
model and derives the main implications. Section 5.3 extends the model to
the analysis of potential public policies. Finally, some concluding remarks
are presented in Section 5.4.
5.2 An economy with concern for face
5.2.1 The model
Suppose a single good economy with individuals i ∈ I of mass 1. Each
individual is initially endowed with wi amount of that good, 0 < w ≤
wi ≤ w. Each individual also has the possibility of making a charitable
giving gi ≥ 0 and is aware that gi, ∀i ∈ I, will be publicly reported af-
ter they simultaneously decided their own giving. Moreover, wi, ∀i ∈ I,
is also common knowledge.4 The utility that one derives from private
consumption xi and donation gi is
u(gi, xi) =
(
f + gi − G−iW−iwi
)α
(xi)1−α, (5.1)
where G−i (W−i) represents the total donation from (endowment of) all
other individuals except i, i.e.,
G−i =
∫
j∈I, j ∕=i
gjdj
(
W−i =
∫
j∈I, j ∕=i
wjdj
)
.
α ∈ (0, 1) and f > 0 (further conditions specified below in inequality (5.8))
are two constants.
4Endowment level wi may be observed directly or inferred in an equilibrium of a sig-
naling game of conspicuous consumption. Further, the complete knowledge assumptions
both of individual donation and endowment are stronger than necessary. In the current
model, as long as the average donation and average endowment are known after the do-
nation and people who are relevant to one’s concern of face know his information, the
argument of face will be valid and the results still hold.
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The first part of the utility function is an individual’s concern for face.
It specifies the degree of face individual i can claim from others, judged
by whether he has functioned adequately on his relative position (wi) in
his social network. An adequate amount of donation for i is formulated
by the product of donation-endowment ratio of all others (G−i/W−i) and
i’s own endowment (wi). Therefore, wiG−i/W−i gives what individual
i should do if he appears at least as “generous” as the average.5 The
difference of individual i’s donation and his “adequate amount” then de-
termines whether i enjoys a gain of face or suffers from losing it. Initially
all individuals are assumed having the same level of “face” f but how
much individuals care about face when they make consumption-donation
decisions is specified by the parameter α. In an economy, the more indi-
viduals care about face, the higher α is. In the extreme case when α goes
to 1, individuals almost only care about face.
The second part of the utility function is an individual’s private consump-
tion. Note that the utility that an individual might derive from the public
goods supplied, G =
∫
gidi, is completely absent. Evidence has shown
that both pure altruistic and warm glow motivations are important for the
understanding of private donation.6 However, since the primary tasks in
this chapter are to investigate the direct benefits from the act of giving and
to provide alternative explanations for the behavior of voluntary donation,
we leave out this pure altruistic motivation.7
5.2.2 Analysis
Each individual maximizes utility (5.1) subject to budget constraint. The
problem reads,
max
xi ,gi
(
f + gi − G−iW−iwi
)α
(xi)1−α
5In this chapter, we do not discuss the relationship between individual behavior and
individual character, hence how much one donates in the current context does not help
to know his personal quality of ”generosity”.
6See, for instance, evidence from neuroscience reported in Harbaugh, Mayr, and
Burghart (2007).
7A similar treatment is also used in Glazer and Konrad (1996) and Harbaugh (1998a,
1998b).
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s.t. xi + gi = wi
xi, gi ≥ 0.
Simply substituting xi by the budget constraint,
max
gi
(
f + gi − G−iW−iwi
)α
(wi − gi)1−α
and solving the first order condition gives
gi =
[
α+ (1− α) G−i
W−i
]
wi − (1− α) f . (5.2)
Because individuals are from a population of mass 1,
G−i =
∫
j∈I, j ∕=i
gjdj =
∫
j∈I
gjdj ≡ G
which is the total donation. Similarly
W−i =
∫
j∈I, j ∕=i
wjdj =
∫
j∈I,
wjdj ≡W
which is the total endowment of the population. Apparently,
G−i
W−i
=
G
W
, ∀i ∈ I.
Equation (5.2) can now be written as
gi =
[
α+ (1− α) G
W
]
wi − (1− α) f . (5.3)
Integrate equation (5.3) over the population,
G =
∫
j∈I
gjdj (5.4)
=
∫
j∈I
[
α+ (1− α) G
W
]
wjdj−
∫
j∈I
(1− α) f dj
=
[
α+ (1− α) G
W
]
W − (1− α) f
= αW + (1− α)G− (1− α) f .
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Solving it for G we have
G =W − 1− α
α
f
and
G
W
= 1− 1− α
α
f
W
. (5.5)
Substituting equation (5.5) back to individual decision (5.3), we obtain
gi =
[
1− (1− α)
2
α
f
W
]
wi − (1− α) f (5.6)
which pins down individual donation level in equilibrium.
To ensure that each individual chooses a positive and feasible amount of
donation in equilibrium, which has been assumed so far, gi has to fulfill
0 < gi < wi, ∀i ∈ I.
That is,
0 <
[
1− (1− α)
2
α
f
W
]
wi − (1− α) f < wi, ∀i ∈ I. (5.7)
The second part of inequality (5.7) can be easily verified and the first part
can be reduced to
f <
(
(1− α)
wi
+
(1− α)2
α
1
W
)−1
, ∀i ∈ I.
Observe that the right hand side of the inequality increases in wi, so if
0 < f <
(
(1− α) 1
w
+
(1− α)2
α
1
W
)−1
(5.8)
then 0 < gi < wi, ∀i ∈ I.
Proposition 5.1. In an economy with a mass 1 population of individuals whose
utility functions are represented by equation (5.1) and condition (5.8) satis-
fied,there exists a unique equilibrium wherein individuals’ charitable giving and
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private consumptions are, ∀i ∈ I,
g∗i =
[
1− (1− α)
2
α
f
W
]
wi − (1− α) f (5.9)
and
x∗i =
(1− α)2
α
f
W
wi + (1− α) f (5.10)
respectively.
Proof. The above construction proves the existence of equilibrium. For
the uniqueness, note first that the cases in which only zero measure of
individuals donate positively do not qualify as equilibrium. Since if that
is the case, the donation from the highest wi can be found by substituting
G = 0 into equation (5.2).
g∗w = αw− (1− α) f
> αw− (1− α)
(
(1− α) 1
w
+
(1− α)2
α
1
W
)−1
= αw− αWw
αW + (1− α)w
= α
(
w (αW + (1− α)w)−Ww
αW + (1− α)w
)
> α
(
Ww−Ww
αW + (1− α)w
)
= 0.
Therefore, a positive measure of individuals whose endowments are close
to the highest level w will have incentive to donate positive amounts,
contradicting to the assumption that there are only zero measure of indi-
viduals donate positively.
When there is a positive measure of individuals who donate positive
amounts, the form of individual strategies can only be βwi − (1 − α) f
where β is a constant. Since the construction in equation (5.4) admits one
and only one solution, there are no other possible strategy combinations
that qualify as equilibrium.
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5.2.3 Comparative statics
Individual donation takes the form of equation (5.9). Given the assump-
tion placed on f in inequality (5.8),
β ≡ 1− (1− α)
2
α
f
W
can be easily verified to be strictly positive. Not surprisingly, individual
donation increases in the endowment level (∂g∗i /∂wi > 0). The more an
individual possesses, the more he is expected to donate and the more he
donates. With own endowment level unchanged, one donates more when
the average endowment (W) of the population increases (∂g∗i /∂W > 0). In
this case, when the society gets richer and others donate more, individual
i catches up with an increase in donation even when his own income
remained constant. The impact of others’ donation can be understood
intuitively as others’ generous donation makes one look bad.
The derivative ∂g∗i /∂α is also larger than zero which means individual
donation increases in α, the parameter which governs how strongly indi-
viduals care about “face”. The more they care, the tougher the contest of
donation gets. The derivative ∂g∗i /∂ f is less than 0 so that private dona-
tion decreases with initial level of face. In many situations, f is related
to the nature of the fund raising’s purpose. When resources are raised to
feed starving people or to provide relief to victims of major natural dis-
asters, the situations speak for themselves and very likely will put each
and every individual in a low level of initial face. In contrast, if some
additional money needs to be raised to build a second football stadium of
a university, then a high level of f can be expected.
The individual donation endowment ratio, defined as
g∗i
wi
=
[
1− (1− α)
2
α
f
W
]
− (1− α) f
wi
,
is also increasing in individual wealth. Rich people tend to donate larger
proportions of their endowments to charity in our simple model. Techni-
cally, this is a result of the constant term f and the structure of the utility
function. The intuition is, for poor individuals, private consumption is
more important given that there is an initial level of “face”, while for
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∂wi ∂W ∂α ∂ f
∂g∗i ; ∂
(
g∗i
wi
)
+ + + −
∂x∗i + − − +
∂G∗; ∂(G∗W ) ╱ + + −
∂X∗ 0 0 − +
Table 5.1: Comparative Statics: the signs represent the direction of change
of a row variable when a column variable increases
richer ones, to increase their overall as well as marginal benefit of private
consumption, a larger proportion of additional wealth will go to charitable
giving. There are real world observations of wealthy individuals donating
most of their wealth.
Both, total donation
G∗ =W − 1− α
α
f
and total donation endowment ratio
G∗
W
= 1− 1− α
α
f
W
increase in total endowment W and the parameter α but decreases in f .
The proportion of total wealth that a society donates for charitable purpose
increases in total wealth and in the relevance of “face” to individuals
utility. Total private consumption
X∗ =W − G∗ = 1− α
α
f
which is surprisingly independent of the level of wealth. In other words,
when society is getting richer, increased wealth will be entirely transferred
to donation. Above results are summarized in Table 5.1 and Result 5.1.
Result 5.1. Ceteris paribus
i) When an individual’s wealth is increased, his donation level, donation income
ratio and private consumption increase.
ii) When society’s wealth is increased, an individual with original wealth level
will increase his donation level which in turn increases his donation income
ratio and decreases his private consumption; Society’s donation level and
donation income ratio will also increase.
103
iii) When individuals are more concerned with face, individual donation level
and donation income ratio increase and private consumption decreases. Same
effects apply to the society level.
iv) When initial face level is increased, individual donation level and donation
income ratio decrease and private consumption increases. Same effects apply
to the society level.
5.2.4 Wealth, donation and happiness
With increased wealth and increased donation, will individuals be hap-
pier? In equilibrium, individual utility is
u(g∗i , x
∗
i ) =
(
f + g∗i −
G−i
W−i
wi
)α
(x∗i )
1−α
= (1− α) f
[
α
(1− α) +
wi
W
]α [1− α
α
(wi
W
)
+ 1
]1−α
= u
(wi
W
; α, f
)
. (5.11)
Consequently, the relative endowment (wi/W) determines individual util-
ity. If each and every individual is endowed 50% more of wealth, the
resulting relative wealth ratio remains the same for all, so does everyone’s
utility. But in aggregation,
G∗
′
= 1.5W − 1− α
α
f
which is a 0.5W increase compared to original donation and also is the
entire wealth increase. Therefore, they donate more but consume the
same and end up with an unchanged utility despite the fact that each has
50% more of endowment. This observation, like results of other models of
interdependent preferences, helps to understand the Easterlin (1974) Para-
dox, namely average happiness seems not to be increasing with average
wealth once basic needs (X∗) are fulfilled.
Result 5.2. i) Individual utility is determined by the ratio of one’s own wealth
to the average wealth (5.11).
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ii) When each individual’s wealth is changed with a same proportion, provided
that condition (5.8) is satisfied, individuals’ equilibrium utility remain un-
changed.
5.3 An extension with public policy
We will not discuss government funds’ crowding out effect using our
much simplified model. Individuals do not derive direct utility from the
total supply of public good and their engagement in charity is solely mo-
tivated by their own personal reasons i.e., to gain or not to lose face. A
direct transfer from government to charity has no impact to the individual
utility; equilibrium donation remains the same.
5.3.1 Proportional subsidy
The policy of proportional subsidy, however, is relevant. Suppose for each
dollar donated by an individual, the government reimburses a fraction of
t, 0 < t < 1. Then for the same utility function (5.1), the budget constraint
now reads
xi + (1− t)gi = wi.
After similar steps, we obtain the equilibrium donation
g∗i (t) =
[
1
1− t −
(1− α)2
α
f
W
]
wi − (1− α) f . (5.12)
Equation (5.12) differs from the original solution (5.9) by an increase in
marginal spending on donation.8 Private consumption in equilibrium now
8The condition that has to be put on f to insure interior solution, which we assume
is satisfied, is now
0 < f <
[
(1− t)
(
(1− α) 1
w
+
(1− α)2
α
1
W
)]−1
.
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is
x∗i (t) = wi − (1− t)g∗i (t)
= (1− t)
[
(1− α)2
α
f
W
wi + (1− α) f
]
.
Clearly, with government subsidy donation becomes “cheaper” and peo-
ple donate more. However, what it is perhaps surprising is that private
consumption is now only a fraction (1− t) of what is consumed without
the subsidy. Hence, government subsidy did not help individuals to save
on charitable giving instead it increased their donation level.
As a result of increased individual donation, aggregate donation
G∗(t) =
W
1− t −
1− α
α
f
increases with the cost to the government being
tG∗(t) =
Wt
1− t −
1− α
α
f t. (5.13)
Is it well spent from the point of view of the total supply of public goods?
The increased donation is
∆G(t) = G∗(t)− G∗(t = 0) = Wt
1− t
which exceeds the government spending (5.13) by f t(1− α)/α. This is
exactly the difference between private consumptions with and without
the government subsidy since
∆X(t) = X∗(t)− X∗(t = 0)
= (1− t) 1− α
α
f − 1− α
α
f
= −1− α
α
f t.
Result 5.3. A proportional subsidy rate of t costs the government
Wt
1− t −
1− α
α
f t
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but increases total donation by Wt/(1− t). The difference f t(1− α)/α is cov-
ered by a reduction in individuals’ private consumption.
Public subsidy for donation seems to be a beneficial policy for individuals
because it in effect lowers the price of donation. A closer look reveals the
opposite. In equilibrium, individuals donate even more than what they
used to donate before the subsidy. The reason is the following. Suppose
every one else donates the original amount, an individual will place some
of the money saved from the subsidy to donation while still have some
left for private consumption. This, however, is not an equilibrium. When
every one donates more, which has a negative impact on an individual’s
level of face, this individual will catch up in donation to equalize his
marginal rate of substitution to the price ratio.
In equilibrium, we found that individuals increase the same percentage
of individual wealth to donation compared the case without subsidy. In
the end, however, they all obtain the same level of face as they do in the
original case. One can verify that the final levels are both
α f + (1− α) f
W
wi
by using the results we obtained before. Therefore, in aggregate, increased
individual donations will not bring any one any increase in face. The de-
crease in private consumption, however, results an unambiguous decrease
of utility to all individuals. The utility with subsidy can be written as
u(g∗i , x
∗
i ; t) = (1− t)1−αu(g∗i , x∗i ; t = 0). (5.14)
So the higher the subsidy is the lower individual utility will be.
Result 5.4. Excluding the benefits from the provided public goods, a government
subsidy for individual donation reduces individual utility.
To summarize, a government subsidy encourages individuals engaging in
face gaining activities. Had the subsidy only applied to one individual,
it’s true that this individual would have benefited from this subsidy since
his budget set would have expanded; he would also have donated more to
obtain a higher level of face. But the subsidy applies to all individuals, the
negative externalities of donation to each other render individuals’ higher
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level of donation completely ineffective in face improving. The concept of
equilibrium also excludes the possibility for the individuals to maintain
the original non-subsidized donation level.
5.3.2 A welcomed tax
If the proportional subsidy rate t is set to be negative (t < 0), the gov-
ernment then in fact levies on each dollar donated a tax of −t. In this
case, donation gets more “expensive” and indeed the amount donated
will decrease, see equation (5.12). Private consumption will increase since
now people save on donation even though they have to pay tax for it. As
we can see from individual utility level (5.14), individuals are better off
when t decreases (lower subsidy or higher tax). Hence, the more severely
the government taxes donation, the higher individual utility will be. Note
that the benefit from the supply of total donation is not modeled. If the
money raised is wasted, for instance, when the transfers are not donations
to charity but contributions to wasteful consumption in the occasion of a
festival or the like. Taxation on this type of gift giving is beneficial to
all. Individuals enjoy higher utilities while the government can also raise
money.
The logic behind this perverse result, namely taxation on private “con-
sumption” of gift giving can lead to higher utilities of the individuals, is
in line with Mill (1848)’s argument for taxation of conspicuous consump-
tion.
5.4 Concluding remarks
The argument for face builds on the importance of social acceptance to an
individual’s all other activities. It is also crucial that individual donations
are publicly observable for “face” to be a relevant motivation. Both points
have more significant relevance in the East, especially East Asian countries
than in the West. Face in some places is such an important concept and
being referred to “no face” is an outright insult. The loss of face “makes
it impossible for him to function properly within the community” (Ho
(1976)). Indeed some researchers suggest that “face” should be accepted
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as an important theoretical concept in the literature. For example, Kim
and Nam (1998) in management literature. To a lesser extent, the idea of
“face” is also relevant in Western countries where individualism is more
prominent.
Though it’s true that donation should be and in many communities is a
private conduct. In some other communities where people tend to openly
discuss all kinds of information it is practically public. In those commu-
nities, individual wealth level is quite often also commonly known both
because individuals signal out the information to obtain their relative po-
sitions in the social network and because those communities also are more
stratified which makes the inference of wealth level easier. Note that as
long as people who are relevant to a person know that person’s conduct
and wealth, the face argument is valid. It does not need all individuals
in a society know every donation and wealth level. In the West, theories
on conspicuous consumption and status game support that individual
income is at least partially observable. Charitable activities that attract
public attention are also quite common.
The approach presented here is based on a story of concern for face. It’s
by nature a social concept. The model, however, can also address purely
moral motivations of donation. In this context, individuals compare what
they’ve done to what they “should” have done. An outdoing would gen-
erally make one to feel being more than a responsible person and an
insufficient conduct would make one less comfortable. The assumptions
that each individual ascribes to the same reference rule and shares the
same value of αand f are admittedly strong. Nevertheless, the “nega-
tive externality” of one’s donation to others’ enjoyment of “being a good
person” is robust and the current work maybe helpful for future research.
In an economy with concern for face, a publicly reported charitable fund
raising is a big contest.9 Because when individuals making their deci-
sions they do not take the negative externality to others into account, in
equilibrium a large part of donations from each individual does not give
anyone any measure of benefit. This observation is similar to the results
of status games wherein a large part of spending on positional goods is
9In moral context, instead of competing directly with each other, each individual
competes with the fictional self whose characteristic is prescribed collectively by all other
individuals.
109
simply wasted. The difference here is, the resources that are raised by
a charity can be put into good uses rather than being wasted. The cur-
rent model does not allow a complete analysis of welfare implications.
However, when the gifts that individuals give end up with festivals and
unnecessary conspicuous consumptions, taxation on this type of gift giv-
ing is favorable.
An interesting finding is the total private consumption of an economy
does not change with aggregate income. Such economies consume more
when there is no situation that induces a low level of initial face ( f ) and
when individuals care less about face (α). When a “gift” tax is levied,
individuals actually consume more and attain higher utility levels than
without the tax.
In conclusion, in this chapter we present concern for face as one possi-
ble motivation behind visible conducts, especially in charitable donations.
The policy analysis should be interpreted with caution since we have not
included individuals’ preference for the provided public goods. When the
visible conduct in question is beneficial to no one, individuals’ sacrifice of
private consumption is inefficient.
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Chapter 6
Further Research
In this chapter, I discuss several possible future research projects for each
of the previously presented topics.
6.1 Capturable certifiers and umbrella branding
6.1.1 Capturable certifiers
In Chapter 2, certifiers are assumed to only passively use their testing
technology. Therefore, the strategic aspect of manipulating testing results
is absent. It is nevertheless an important research topic. In the case
of perfect testing technology, Strausz (2005) employs a repeated game
framework and finds that a monopoly certifier is less likely to be captured
since it has more profit to lose than competitive certifiers. This insight was
first put forward in Klein and Leﬄer (1981)’s seminal work on reputation.
Whether certifiers will honestly reveal testing results and under what cir-
cumstances will they do so when their testing technology is imperfect?
This will be a natural direction for future research. Presumably, the like-
lihood that a certifier is captured is linked to the underlying quality type
distribution and the nature of the imperfect testing technology. A more
subtle point is how to differentiate the case where a certifier manipulates
a testing result from the case in which it makes an honest mistake. An
idea is to model consumers’ trust on a certifier being depreciating only
gradually when they observe bad quality products being certified. Con-
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sumers will also take the nature of the testing technology into account in
such a way that when the testing technology is more precise, they will be
less tolerant of certified bad quality products. A more interesting case is
when there are multiple certifiers on the market.
6.1.2 Umbrella branding
Chapter 2 is concerned with an asymmetric information model with an
adverse selection problem. In many situations, market provision of quality
is also a moral hazard problem. Brand name products are often associated
with high quality and in consequence are charged with a quality premium.
This is an example of mitigating asymmetric information problem by es-
tablishing reputation. It is also a common practice to leverage reputation
of one product to others via umbrella branding. With emphases being
put on consumer belief and punishment strategy, a new research project
will explore additional possible yet relevant equilibria other than those
already treated in the literature (Cabral 2009, Hakenes and Peitz 2008).
Both certification and umbrella branding can be seen as practices intend-
ing to reduce information asymmetry. Hakenes and Peitz (2009) study
to which extent umbrella branding can replace outside certification. This
paper, however, proposes only a one-period model. Drawing on my re-
searches in certification and umbrella branding, I plan to investigate the
interaction of these two practices in a repeated game setting, hoping to
uncover the underlying long-run relationship.
6.2 Elastic demand in the Hotelling model and em-
pirical investigation of spatial models
6.2.1 Elastic demand in the Hotelling model
The Salop model has been widely used to address entry issues in prod-
uct differentiation while the Hotelling model is often used to investigate
firms’ location decision. Since traditionally both models mainly feature
products of unit demand, our initiative of considering general elastic de-
mand can be applied in the Hotelling model as well. Our main interest
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is to revisit previous results on “minimum” versus “maximum” product
differentiation under elastic demand. Rath and Zhao (2001) introduce a
linear demand function and quadratic transportation cost in a Hotelling
model and find both minimal and maximal differentiation are possible.
Our approach in Chapter 4 is more general and we expect our finding
will encompass their result as a special case.
6.2.2 Empirical investigation of spatial models
As we have argued, once elastic demand is included efficiency issues can
be properly addressed in spatial models. In many situations, however,
a real answer to a specific market can only be provided by a carefully
conducted empirical investigation. To test whether our work in Chapter 4
provides a good framework for empirical studies of spatial models, I am
interested in carrying out an empirical research of bottled and canned beer
market.1 Following the theoretical guidance, an estimation of consumer
demand function of beer based on market data will be the first step. Of
course, a good estimation of transportation or taste parameter is hard to
grasp but data on variety switch caused by price changes might be very
helpful in this regard. In the end, I hope I will be able to provider better
answers to efficiency questions.
6.3 An experimental investigation of concern for rel-
ative social approval (face): a research proposal
In Chapter 5, I presented a theoretical explanation of charitable giving
and introduced individuals’ concern for face as a case of interdependent
preferences. In the following, I present a self contained research proposal
of an experiment. I first review the relevant theories then proceed to
experiment design.
1Beer is an idea example for our theoretical model in Chapter 4 since normally each
consumer has a small number of preferred variety of beer or even only one favorite variety
of beer.
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6.3.1 Theories
Andreoni (1989, 1990) differentiates pure altruism and impure altruism in
private provision of public goods. While the former denotes a donor’s
preference for the well-being of others, the latter is defined to high-
light private benefits of giving. The nature of private benefits or warm-
glow is, however, less well understood. Besides internal moral concerns
(Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg, 2003), “prestige benefit” (Harbaugh
1998a, 1998b) and signaling motivations (Glazer and Konrad, 1996), Gu
(2008b)2 argues that an individual’s concern for social approval is also
an important motivation for making positive contributions. This concern
therefore, constitutes one form of impure altruism. Differing from other
models of social acceptance (Holla¨nder 1990, Lindbeck 1997), Gu (2008b)
emphasizes an individual’s relative position in the social network and intro-
duces the concept of “face” (Ho, 1976). When individuals are concerned
with “face”, the wealthier will need to contribute more than the poorer in
order to gain an equal level of social approval. In the current project, we
intend to empirically investigate this relative-position-adjusted concern.
6.3.2 Experiment design
To investigate this concern for relative social approval, we use a linear
Public Goods Game (hereafter PGG, for a survey see Ledyard 1995) with
two modifications. First, we introduce the opportunity of receiving social
approval into the otherwise anonymous PGG. Since Laury, Walker, and
Williams (1995), there have been a few studies of social approval using
PGGs with subjects’ identity observable. Gachter and Fehr (1999) allow
subjects to express and receive social approval after the game and Rege
and Telle (2004) create a situation in which their subjects present their
own contribution level in front of all subjects. The results of these exper-
iments are mixed but we leave detailed analysis to future development of
this project. By social approval, we also mean non-pecuniary sanctions.
Therefore, we do not discuss the approach of Fehr and Gachter (2000).
Our second modification to the game is on the distribution of endow-
ments. In normal PGGs, subjects are endowed equally. To investigate if
2Also Chapter 5 of this thesis
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the concern for social approval will make wealthier subjects contribute
more, we assign, say, the ten integers from 21 to 30 randomly (without
replacement) to ten subjects as their initial endowment levels. The impact
of endowment heterogeneity in public goods experiments is studied in
Chan, Mestelman, Moir, and Muller (1999), Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren
(2005) and Kroll, Cherry, and Shogren (2007).
We intend to run our experiment with the following three treatments:
1. Normal anonymous PGG but with heterogeneous endowments (pure
altruism, preference for fairness, intrinsic benefits of giving)
2. Let individual contributions be observable but not endowment levels
(social approval, prestige effect)
3. Let both individual contributions and endowment levels be observ-
able (relative social approval/ concern for ”face”)
Cited in parentheses are the related theories. Observed experiment re-
sults will also be compared to the findings in normal PGGs, PGGs with
endowment heterogeneity (Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren 2005) and PGGs
with social approval treatment (Gachter and Fehr 1999, Rege and Telle
2004). The proposed experiment will investigate if the concern for “face”
is relevant in individuals’ decision-making processes and will attempt to
shed light on both the nature of social approval and its impact on coop-
erative behavior in communities.
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